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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Human beings are observed to respond to stimulation 
of whose presence they are unaware. Indeed, if responses 
are considered to include even the most trifling and incon-
seq1ential kinds, and if stimulation is considered to in-
elude both interoceptive and exteroceptive varieties, in-
dividuals are aware of only a small number of the stimulus-
response relationships in their own behavior.1 ' 2 Yet labor-
atory research upon unnoticed, incidental stimulation is 
still at a comparatively primitive stage. 
In classifying laboratory studies of behavior without 
awareness, Adams3 points out that the Jack of awareness 
may be with respect to any of a number of aspects of behav-
ior which we usually a~sume to be present in awareness. 
S may be unaware of his own actions, as in unconscious 
whispering. He may be unaware of a systematic relationship 
which exists or is being formed between his behavior and 
1
"we recognize a face without noting the specific features; 
we throw and catch balls when their tra~ectories are far 
too complex for a physicist to predict. (G. S. Klein, On 
subliminal activation, J. Nerv. Ment. Dis., 128, 1959, 
p. 296.) 
2nEven most complex, ordered thought processes take place 
without the participation of consciousness." (D. Rapaport, 
Toward a theory of thinking, in D. Rapaport, Ed., Organiz-
ation and Pathology of Thought, 1951, p. 718.) 
3J. K. Adams, ~~oratory studies of behavior without aware-
ness, Psychol. Bull., 54, 1957, 383-405. 
2 
some environmental events, as through reinforcement of a 
1 
verbal response. He may be trying to discriminate stimuli, 
but have no confidence that his discriminations are success-
ful, as in fact they are. Finally, he may fail to have the 
sensory experiences that usually accompany a given kind of 
stimulation. It is ~th the ~st of these cases that the 
present paper is concerned. 
The quest for "subliminal" effects, defined as a cor-
relation of response with stimulus characteristics Which S 
intends to discriminate but is totally unable to discrimin-
234 
ate consciously, seems likely to fail. ' ' More promising, 
and also more relevant to life outside the perceptual lab-
oratory, is the investigation of responses to stimuli which 
are meaningful to S, but of 1hose existende {in a form in 
which they may carry cue value) he never becomes aware. 
It should be pointed out that such stimulation is fre-
quently supraliminal5 in the sense that it is quite strong 
1 See L. Krasner, Studies of the conditioning of verbal 
behavior, Psychol. Bull., 55, 1958, 148-170. 
2c. w. Eriksen, Subception: fact or artifact? Psychol. 
Rev., 63, 1956, 74-80. 
3I. Goldiamond, Indicators of perc~ption: I. Subliminal 
perception, subception, unconscious perception: an an-
alysis in terms of psychophysical indicator methodology, 
Psychol. Bull., 55, 1958, 373-411. 
4G. s. Klein, op. cit. 
5
"certain stimuli may be well above the threshold and yet 
~e 'subliminal' in the sense that they cannot be reported 
on under certain experimental conditions." {J. v. McCon-
enough for S, if he were fully attending to it, to report 
its presence accurately and perhaps to discriminate its 
cue-significance as well. 
3 
Stimulation which impinges upon S's receptors, but on 
which he does not focus his intention to discriminate, will 
be called (following Kleinl) incidental stimulation. It 
may be noticed or unnoticed, as defined by S 1 s ability or 
inability to report its occurrence under appropriate in-
structions. 
The present research was undertaken in order to study 
further the conditions under which behavior may be influ-
enced through unnoticed incidental stimulation. The classes 
of stimulation employed form one variable under study. The 
classes of behavior which may show the influence form ano-
ther. A further aim was to differentiate degrees of such 
influence, thus pointing the way toward more satisfactory 
quantification in this field. 
The area of this study was further narrowed down to 
include situations where (1) S is attending effortfully 
nell, R. L. Cutler, and E. B. McNeil, Subliminal stimula-
tion: an overview, Amer. Psychologist, 13, 1958, 229-242.) 
The present writer prefers not to use "subliminal" with 
such a referent. For situations in which incidental stim-
ulation bas also been truly subliminal, see the following 
reports, which will be discussed in Chapter II below: 
N. F. Dixon, The effect of subliminal stimulation upon 
autonomic and verbal behavior, J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 57, 
1958, 29-36; F. H. Goldberg, H. Fiss, and G. S. Klein, 
Effects of an undiscriminated stimulus on imagery (paper 
presented at A.P.A. convention, 1959; abstract, Amer.Psy-
chologist, 14, 1959, 359). 
1op. cit., p. 299. 
4 
and objectively to a concurrent task of discrimination; 
(2) S responds immediately and in a constrained fashion 
to that task; (3) the unnoticed incidental stimulation 
constitutes a cue of a class to·which Sis not conscious-
ly prepared to respond; (4) this cue is such as to present 
or dictate a response to the task; and (5) the stimuli in 
use are not known to be systematically affect-related. 
These points will be considered in greater detail in the 
last section of Chapter II below (pages 17-26). 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
'r.he chief interest of this review is in studies bearing 
on response to stimulation of which 3 is unaware. Some 
other closely related material will also be cited. The 
general field is divided, for convenience, into three groups 
reflecting the subjective-introspective, the objective-
behaviorist, and the dynamic-psychoanalytic approaches. 
Subjective-Introspective Studies 
Pillsburyl examined in detail the responses made by 
sophisticated observers to tachistoscopic presentations of 
words. He recognized that active apperception2 is the con-
trolling factor in recognition. Wundt 1 s view of mental 
processes as associations of elements was inadequate, for 
the perception of individual letters depended on the per-
ception of the word. When the percept "arrives," there oc-
curs a sense of relief or ceswation of strain. The percept 
is unified with the rest of our experience, often in a 
faulty or illogical way. Finally, and perhaps more to the 
lw. B. Rillsbury, A study in apperception, Amer. J. Psy-
chol., 8, 1897, 315-393. 
2 
"Apperception: n. 1. The final stage of attentive percep-
tion in which something is clearly apprehended and thus is 
relatively prominent in awareness •••• Apperception is de-
fined in terms of the outmoded psychology of mental con-
tent, but the facts referred to are important and deserve 
restatement in terms of behavior or performance." (H. B. 
English and A. c. English, A Comprehensive Dictionary of 
Psychological and Psychoanalytical ~erms, 1958, pp. 37-38.) 
6 
present purpose: 
"It seems ••• we can have a sensation of so little 
interest in itself, and with associations of such 
great interest, that it comes to consciousness only 
in and through the complex process that it excites."l 
In a paper on the primary awareness of stimulation 
(pre-sensation), Bichowsky2 reported several points of in-
terest to the present study. The pre-sensation is a sort 
of feeling on the basis of which perception develops. It 
may give rise to a range of perceptual or imaginal contents, 
depending on other processes current in the organism. It 
may fail to give rise to its normally corresponding sensa-
tion, when the latter is inhibited by the "higher" activi-
ties of consciousness. In particular, this may occur when 
the chief conscious perceptual activity is especially sus-
ceptible to stimulation, so that (the energy of) the low-
level stimulation is drained off into that activity and 
not via its normal path into conscious sensation. But e-
ven when its sensation is thus ihhibited, the pre-sensation 
still exists and, at least sometimes, has an evident effect 
upon the general affective tone. Thus, an observer who is 
attending to the sight of an apple reports it more pleasant 
when in the presence of a slight, unreportable fruity odor 
than when in the presence of a slight unreportable putrid 
1 Pillsbury, op. cit., pp. 379-380. 
2F. R. Bichowsky, The mechanism of consciousness: the 
pre-sensation, Amer. J. Psychol., 36, 1925, 588-596. 
7 
odor.1 When two incongruous stimuli occur, the first ef-
feet on consciousness is not that of two stimuli but of a 
single fused pre-sensation partaking of the quality of 
both modalities; it is accompanied by a decided emotional 
tone, normally unpleasant. 
2 Cattell presented a more controlled and detailed 
study of much the same ground, together with the objective 
measure of psychogalvanic response. He drew a continuum of 
states of consciousness from the highly objective to the 
completely subjective; in the latter, nothing is conscious 
but pure sensation. The possible relevance for perception 
without awareness is apparent in two of his conclusions: 
"(e) In highly subjective states there is a tendency 
for remote memories to appear spontaneously and in 
completely subjective states there is absence of 
memory. Afterwards the.re is great difficulty in 
recalling the nature of the experience lived in 
the subjective state. 
"(f) In highly subjective conditions there is an 
absence of normal will control and both the feel-
ing and conation which may be aroused tend to 
develop inordinately."3 
Cattell directed attention in particular to experience 
which is not contemplated or cognised objectively. Where 
1 Presumably Bichowsky's S would be aware that odors were 
being or cou~ be presented; hence, the specific cri-
teria for the present study wou~ not be met. 
2R. B. Cattell, The subjective character of cognition 
and the pre-sensational development of perception. 
Brit. J. Psychol. Monogr. Suppl., XIV, 1930. 
3 Ibid • , p • 88 • 
8 
experience has this characteristic, the organism seems to 
respond in a reflex or instinctive manner. The failure of 
such experience to be registered in memory, thought Cat-
tell, may account for much of what is called repression. 
(This observation suggests a problem related to the 
area under review. If S responds to a stimulus and, una-
a~.·· questioning, reports unawareness of it, was he perhaps 
momentarily aware of it, then immediately represmng any 
memory of the awareness? If the memory proves absolutely 
non-recoverable, then the question is patently unanswerable. 
The memory may yet, however, prove to be recoverable by some 
means. If this were the case, the focus of investigation 
vould probably shift from perception as such to a combina-
tion of perception and the means of recovery.) 
These authors, then, testified to a sort of pre-sensa-
tional process which normally Je ads to a percept but which, 
under some conditions, may J.Bad to illogical associations; 
may enter consciousness only through its effects upon an-
other percept; and may be associated with marked affect. 
Also to be listed with the subjective-introspective 
group is Perky's classic study1 in which 35 Ss fixated a 
ground-glass screen under the instructions to "imagine a 
colored object; for instance, a tomato," etc. The appropri-
ate projected image was increased in intensity until S began 
1c. W. Perky, An experimental study of imagination, Amer. 
J. Psychol., 21, 1910, 422-452. 
9 
to report his imagined image, when it was removed. Gener-
ally, Ss believed themselves to be reporting pure unassisted 
images at levels of illumination at which, when enlightened 
as to the technique employed, they could easily see the stim-
uli. Many reported that, although they had expected the 
image of a banana to be horizontal or that of a leaf to be 
a maple leaf, imagination presented an upright banana or an 
elm leaf {corresponding to the projected image). 
It must be recognized that the subjective-introspective 
group of studies has in general the limitations pointed out 
by Maier.1 In problem-solving and other activities, people 
undoubtedly use certain stimuli and follow certain programs 
2 
of registration and organization that are absolutely una-
vailable to introspection. Nevertheless, the views that the 
authors cited above drew from introspective studies are re-
markably congruent with conclusions reached by students of 
the objective-behaviorist and dynamic-psychoanalytic groups. 
Objective-Behaviorist Studies 
This segment of psychology has, of course, contributed 
many studies bearing on behavior without awareness. The 
1 
2 
N. R. F. Maier, Reasoning in humans: II. The solution of 
a problem and its appearance in consciousness, J. Comp. 
Psychol., 12, 1931, 181-194. 
J. s. Bruner and G. S. Klein use these terms to emphasize 
the programmatic character of perception (Constraints in 
perc~ption, presented at A.P.A. convention, 1959; ref., 
Amer. Psychologist, 14, 1959, 379). 
10 
present review is restricted, for the most part, to cases 
in which there was a discrimination task to which S's at-
tention was directed; an incidental cue was afforded, de-
signed to influence that task; and S was unaware of the 
existence of such a cue. 
A sort of transition from the subjective-introspective 
studies is provided by the c8~'1- ex.pli!'iments of Ivliller. 1 ~ 2 
His Ss believed that they were engaged in an experiment on 
clairvoyance. They were to look at a screen and passively 
allow the image of any of the ESP-card designs to come to 
mind, in an attempt to match an unseen deck. To a signifi-
cant degree, their choices matched the cards whose images 
were being dimly projected on the screen. 
One avenue of approach has involved the use of standard 
optical illusions, with the illusion-producing stimuli at 
subliminal intensity or duration. Dunlap3 employed a form 
of the Muller-Lyer illusion with "wings" so dim that sophis-
ticated observers only rarely reported seeing them. The 
effect of the illusion was very slight, although Dunlap 
considered its presence to be successfully demonstrated. 
1J.G. Miller, Discrimination without awareness, Amer. J. 
Psychol., 52, 1939, 562-578. 
2J.G. Miller, The role of motivation in learning without 
awareness, Amer. J. Psychol., 53, 1940, 229~239. 
3K. Dunlap, The effect of imperceptible shadows on the 
judgments of distance, Psychol. Rev., 7, 1900, 435-453. 
11 
Two later replications1 ' 2 yielded no support; the observers 
involved either were clearly sophisticated or had some sug-
gestion of the nature of the experiment. Bressler3 worked 
with naive Ss and obtained convincing positive results. 
Smith and Henriksson4, :.U~Q,· measured the illusory 
shift in the shape of a trapezoid when fan-shaped lines were 
flashed across it. Using naive Ss and gradually raising the 
flash duration, they found a significant effect upon judg-
ments of shape prior to recognition. Klein,5 however, has 
been unable to confirm such an effect. 
It is questionable, in any case, whether the study of 
illusions may be expected to contribute much to the under-
standing of our problem. What occurs in the kind of dis-
crimination task under consideration may be thought of as 
the addition of information in an unexpected mode. Eriksen 
and Hake6 have shown that supplying information in two or 
1E.B. Titchener .and W.H. Pyle, Effect of imperceptible sha-
dows on the judgment of distance, Proc. Amer. Phil. Soc., 
46, 1907, 94-109· 
2H.M. Manro and M.F. Washburn, Effect of imperceptible lines 
on judgment of distance, Amer •. ·J. Psycho!., 19, 1908, 242-
243. 
3J. Bressler, Illusion in the case of subliminal visual 
stimulation, J. Gen. Psycho!., 5, 1931, 244-250. 
4G.J.W. Smith and M. Henriksson, The effect on an estab-
lished percept of a perceptual process beyond awareness, 
Acta Psychol., 11, 1955, 346-355. 
5G.S. Klein, personal communication, 1959. 
6c.w. Eriksen and H.W. Hake, Multidimensional stimulus dif-
ferences and accuracy of discrimination, J. Exp• Psycho!., 
50, 1955, 153-160. 
12 
three modes rather than in one alone increases the accuracy 
of discriminations, at least where all such modes or stimu-
lus qualities are known and expected by s. 
One way of supplying information in an unexpected mode 
is through a different sensory modality. Information de-
signed to influence a yisual task could be supplied through 
audition, or the reverse. No study is known which fits the 
paradigm being considered here; that is, with S remaining 
ignorant as regards the existence of the incidental stimu-
lation.1 
Using a single sensory modality, experiments have been 
reported in which Ss were indeed unaware of the incidental 
stimulation. In the experiment of Klein, Spence, Holt, and 
Gourevitch, 2 Ss were looking·for clues regarding the per-
sonality characteristics of projected drawings of faces. 
In two subsequent studies,3' 4 they were looking for and 
1For a somewhat related study, however, see H. Ohms, Unter-
suchung unterwertigen Assoziationen mittels des Worter-
kennungsvorganges, z. Psychol.; 56, 1910, 1-84. 
2G.S. Klein, D.P. Spence, R.R. Holt, and S. Gourevitch, 
Cognition without awareness: subliminal influence upon 
conscious thought, J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 57, 1958, 255-
266. 
3s. Bach and G.S. Klein, Conscious effects of prolonged 
subliminal exposures of words (paper presented at A.P.A. 
convention, 1957; abstract, Amer. Psychologist, 12, 1957, 
397.) . 
4 G.J.W. Smith, D.P. Spence, and G.S. Klein, Subliminal ef-
fects of verbal stimuli, J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 59, 1959, 
167-176. 
13 
usually imagining that they discriminated slight (ficti-
tious) changes in a face. Ss responded in open-ended 
fashion, and the response categories were broad. In each 
of these cases, responding was shown to be influenced by 
flashed or otherwise unnoticed stimulation. 
Kolers1 ' 2 has used unnoticed stimulation as an influ-
ence upon varyingly complex perceptual-cognitive tasks. 
In his Part II the recognized stimulus, briefly presented 
to S, consisted of three lines of four small figures each. 
The task was to report which figure (e.g., square, circle, 
triangle) appeared in all three lines. There were, in fact, 
two right answers, one of which had been presented as an 
unnoticed flash. Control Ss received a blank flash.3 The 
stimulus sequence--unnoticed flash followed by the complex 
figure, which lasted 0.3 second--was repeated to a cri-
terion of ten repetitions of t~e same response, or to a 
total of 25 sequences. The unnoticed flash was indeed 
found to influence the choice of a right answer. 
1 
2 
P. A. Kolers, Subliminal stimulation in simple and com-
plex cognitive processes,(Unpublished doctoral disserta-
tion, New York Univer., 1956). 
P. A. Kolers, Subliminal stimulation in problem-solving, 
Amer. J. Psycbol., 70, 1957, 437-441. In this published 
artic.le, Parts II and III of the dissertation were re-
numbered I and II, while the original Part I was omitted. 
As used herein, part numbers refer to the dissertation. 
3Kolers' overall design required the use of a blank flash 
here rather than a flash of the other right answer for 
half of the Ss. 
14 
In his Part III, designed to tap a more complex level 
of cognitive functioning, Kolers' Ss had the problem of 
finding the hidden element which was common to a series of 
complex figures. Again there were repeated trials to a 
criterion; again the correct element was presented to half 
the Ss as an unnoticed flash briefly preceding the problem 
stimulus (which again lasted 0.3 second). These Ss required 
fewer trials to reach the criterion of ten consecutive cor-
rect responses than did Ss who received a blank flash. 
Kolers' experiment was designed to test whether in-
formation given to S without awareness can affect his be-
havior at all points in a series of tasks including both 
higher and lower levels of cognitive functioning. It in-
cluded a procedure (Part I, somewhat similar to the experi-
ments of the Klein group referred to just above) testing 
the effect of unnoticed flashed figures on impressions of 
a face. This task was thought to involve only a low ~vel 
of cognitive function, appealing primarily to "egocentric 
attitudes and feelings." In this procedure also, an effect 
of the unrecognized stimulation was apparent. In fine, 
Kolers was able to draw the inference that many levels of 
cognitive functioning may be affected through unnoticed 
incidental stimulation. 
In Kolers' "low-level" task just described, Ss were 
instructed not to look carefully and analytically, but to 
relax and to be "imaginative and impressionistic." Similar 
15 
instructions were employed by Eagle.1 Using a somewhat 
different method of tachistoscopic presentation, he ob-
tained differential effects from the use of unperceived 
stimuli depicting aggressive and benevolent actions. It 
appears, therefore, that an effortful perceptual task is 
not necessary for the occurrence of effects related to 
unnoticed incidental stimulation. 
It is suggested, indeed, by Goldberg, Fiss, and Klein2 
that the effortful perceptual task militates against any ap-
pearance of such effects. These authors carefully reduced 
the amount of stimulation to a level where S could no longer 
discriminate with even partial accuracy among three figures. 
They then instructed S to relax while a new stinmlus figure 
was exposed at a still briefer duration. These well-trained 
Ss reported only a quick flicker. Yet, when asked to let 
their minds wander and "invite" images, their descriptions 
and drawings of the images were found to be related to the 
content of the very briefly exposed stimuli. In a final 
procedure, Ss were shown the two stimulus figures used and 
tried to discriminate them at the same duration used in the 
1 M. Eagle, The effects of subliminal stimuli of aggressive 
content upon conscious cognition, J. Pers., 27, 1959, 
578-600. 
2F. H. Goldberg, H. Fiss, and G. S. Klein, Effects of an 
undiscriminated stimulus on imagery (paper presented at 
A.P.A. convention, 1959; abstract, Amer. Psychologist, 
14, 1959, 359). 
16 
relaxed condition; they could do so only at a chance level. 
In a similar procedure, Dixon1 instructed Ss to main-
tain a relaxed, passive attitude while observing a contin-
uous but very dimly projected image of a word. (Of 12 stim-
uli, six were emotionally loaded words.) They then guessed 
what the word might be, and later gave an association to 
each of the guesses. A week later, being shown a list of 
the stimulus words, they tried to match it to a list of 
their responses, not in a logical fashion but in terms of 
their personal, even autistic associations. In general, 
these Ss did not guess the stimulus word accurately, but 
their guesses and associations were judged to be related to 
that word, and were significantly matched to it in the later 
test. Also recorded were the latency of each response and 
the galvanic skin response accompanying it. Both of these 
were greater in the case of the emotionally loaded words 
than for the others, the latter measure significantly so. 
Dynamic-Psychoanalytic Studies 
Within the dynamic-psychoanalytic group, the experiments 
of Potzl2 and his successors are the only series immediately 
1N.F. Dixon, The effect of subliminal stimulation upon au-
tonomic and verbal behavior, J. Abn. Soc. Psycho!., 57, 
1958, 29-36. 
2o. Potzl, Experimental! erregte Traumbilder in ihren Be-
ziehungen zum indirekten Sehen, z. Neurol. Psychiat., 37, 
1917, 278-349. 
17 
related to the present specific field. P8tzl, whose inter-
est had been directed to visual anomalies of various kinds, 
used a tachistoscopic presentation of pictures--landscapes 
and street scenes--to study modes of handling stimulation 
that was presented in peripheral vision, perceived but not 
apperceived and not immediately reportable. The "motoric 
barrier" thus created was thought of as equivalent to re-
pression. P8tzl found that images reported from dreams' 
subsequent to the exposure were symbolically related to 
the unreportable features of the pictures. 
This general method has been used with variations 
and refinements by others.112 Although not always performed 
according to rigid standards, these experiments apparently 
have demonstrated effects due to unperceived stimulation. 
The effects have appeared not only in dream reports but in 
word associations and freely wandering imagery. 
Discussion: Restrictions of the Situation 
A review of three groups of studies, insofar as they 
relate to the interest ·Of the present paper, has been given 
above. Some of the findings of these studies can now be 
considered in connection with the five restrictions of the 
1R. Allers and J. Teler, ~er die Verwertung unbemerkter 
EindrHcke bei Assoziationen, z. ges. Neurol. Psychiat., 
1924, 89, 492-513. 
2H. Shevrin and L. Luborsky, The measurement of preconscious 
perception in dreams and images: an investigation of the 
PBtzl phenomenon, J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 56, 1958, 285-294. 
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experimental situation which have been adopted in narrowing 
the area of the present interest. These restrictions were 
stated without amplification in Chapter I (pp. 3-4). They 
specify that (1) S is attending effortfully and objectively 
to a concurrent discrimination task; (2) S responds immedi-
ately and in a constrained fashion to that task; (3) the un-
noticed incidental stimulation constitutes a cue of a class 
to which S is not consciously prepared to respond; (4) this 
cue is such as to present or dictate a response to the task; 
and (5) affective factors are not intentionally induced. 
These restrictions will be discussed, and assumptions 
which the writer has made in orde~ tq proceed to an experi-
mental test will be stated. 
"Objedltive" vs. "subjective" attitudes. The words are 
used in Cattell's1 sense: Is S required to pay effortful 
attention to an objective task, or is he instructed to relax 
and disregard the precision of his perceptions? 
It should be noted that in neither case is attention 
being directed to the stimulation which is of interest to 
the experimenter; that is, the incidental stimulation. In 
the "objective" case, S is paying effortful attention to 
some other stimulation, being engaged in some task related 
to it. In the "subjective" case, S withholds altogether his 
analytical attention. 
1R.B. Cattell, The Subjective Character of Co~nition and the 
Pre-sensational Development of Perception, 1 36. See p. 7 
above. 
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In this connection, it is worth while to repeat the 
comment made on page 2 above. If S is aware of and is try-
ing to discriminate a given stimulus, and if the latter is 
so weak that he is quite unable to do so,.then it appears 
that no characteristic of that stimulus will modify S's be-
havior. 
"The evidence seems to indicate that where S's intention 
is to discriminate, he cannot do so successfully until 
some critical, minimal se~ent of the field is conscious-
ly apprehendable."l 
Reference was made abo~e (page ?) to Cattell's interest 
in experience which is not contemplated or cognised objec-
tively, and which may not be registered in memory. Ordinarily, 
such experience accompanies the subjective attitude. But 
Cattell also suggested2 that stimuli might be experienced 
in this mode without awareness while S was attending to an-
other task. That they often are seems indisputable. An in-
dividual may begin to whistle a tune shortly after the tune 
has been played, although, having had his attention directed 
elsewhere at the time, he cannot remember hearing it. 
Goldberg, Fiss, and Klein3 state that.the Sin a dis-
crimination task, being 
1F.H. Goldberg and H. Fiss, Partial cues and the phenomenon 
of "discrimination without awareness," Percep. Mot. Skills, 
9, 1959, 243-251. 
20p. cit., p. 158. 
3F.H. Goldberg, H. Fiss, and G.S. Klein, Effects of an un-
discrirr~nated stimulus on imagery, p. 3 (paper presented at 
A.P.A. convention, 1959; abstract, Amer. Psychologist, 14, 
1959, 359). Emphasis by the original authors. 
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"geared to one end only--to achieve identity of 
the stimulus ••• gives priority to perceivable 
information in his decisions ••• For discrimina-
tion, the consequence of this behavior is that 
the task samples only a very narrow segment of 
the activated cognitive field ••• " 
(Within the activated field they include the effects 
of any stimulation that may be responded to.) Hence, as 
regards incidental stimulation, they elPect to find its 
effects only or chiefly 
"in states of consciousness where it is not 
obscured by the S's need to represent realitY. 
effectively and accurately in his response."l 
A classification of' the relevant studies is presented 
below in Table I. It is apparent that at least four 
studies may be cited to illustrate that effects due to 
incidental stimulation do occur when S is effortf'ully 
trying for accurate perception. It appears, therefore, 
that Goldberg, Fiss, a1d Klein have overstated the ex-
tant to which such a state of' consciousness prevents 
the registration and use of incidental stimulation. 
The assumption is made that incidental stimulation can 
af'f'ect effortf'ul, attended behavior as well.as relaxed, 
unattended behavior. 
1 Ibid., p. 3. 
Response 
Open-ended, may 
be delayed 
Constrained, 
immediate 
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TABLE I 
CLASSIFICATION OF STUDIES 
Attitude induced in S: 
ObJect~ve, e1·1·ortrul; SubJect~ve, relaxe 
S is trying for ac- not trying for ac-
curate perception curate perception 
Klein, Spence, Holt Kolers, Part I 
and Gourevitch Goldberg, Fiss, 
Bach and Klein and Klein 
Smith, Spence, and Dixon* 
Klein Eagle* 
. 
Kolers, Parts II Perky 
and III Miller 
*Partly constrained responding 
Immediate, constrained vs. open responding. Is S re-
stricted to a rather small choice of responses in the task 
which is set him? Must he respond almost at once? 
None of the cited authors has dealt speci~ically with 
this question. Klein, 1 however, indicates that any effects 
of incidental stimulation are likely to 
d· 
' 
"be delayed, and show themselves on levels of behavior 
and in states of consciousness bearing little similar-
ity to the original contents of stimulation and report." 
This is thought especially likely to be the case where 
1 G.S. Klein, On subliminal activation, J. Nerv. Ment. Dis-
ease, 128, 1959, p. 299. 
S is attending fully to a discrimination task. In such a 
state of controlled consciousness, incidental activations 
are expected to be almost completely excluded from the task 
behavior. Then: 
"As reality contact and reality requirements are mini-
mized, so the prospects of incidentally registered 
material emerging to awareness in passive imagery may 
increase." 
Table I, however, shows that three experimenters1 ' 2 '3 
did obtain effects from incidental stimulation when respond-
ing was constrained and immediate. It appears to the writer 
that Klein tends to overestimate the degree to which con-
trolled states of consciousness actually exclude incidental 
activations. The difference of viewpoint is relative, not 
absolute. In a given experimental situation, however, the 
difference might amount to an absolute. That is, in the 
state of consciousness employed, incidental activations 
might be excluded to such a degree that their predicted ef-
fect would fail to appear. This risk was run in the experi-
ments of the present study. 
1c.w. Perky, An experimental study of imagination, Amer. J. 
Psychol., 21, 1910, 422-452. 
2J.G. Ndller, Discrimination without awareness, Amer. J. 
Psychol., 52, 1939, 562-578. 
3P.A. Kolers, Subliminal stimulation in problem-solving, 
Amer. J. Psychol., 70, 1957, 437-441. 
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Novel class of cue; response dictation. Is the inci-
dentally supplied cue of such a nature that S, if he were 
aware of it, could readily assimilate it into the conduct 
of his main task? 
The answer must be a matter of qegree, related to the 
strength of the associative linkages involved. Suppose that 
S is trying to detect slight changes in the expression of a 
projected face. Presumably he could more readily assimilate 
a briefly exposed frowning face than the word ANGRY. Again, 
imagine S trying to receive by clairvoyance one of the ESP-
card designs. Presumably he cou~ more readily assimilate 
into his behavior a star design than the printed word STAR, 
and could assimilate STAR more readily than ETOILE (assuming 
that French is less familiar to him than is English). 
Of interest here is the a:J.alysis of Kolers' experiment, 
Parts II and III, in these terms. Here the incidentally sup-
plied cues were exactly what S was looking for in his examin-
ation of the inspection figures--i.e., an element Which met 
the specifications of the task. This places Kolers' work in 
contrast to that of other experimenters who used quite un-
locked-for types of cue. It also creates some doubt whether 
his results would have been obtained if the incidental cue had 
been less closely associated with the material of the task, 
and hence presumably less assimilable into task performance. 
A closely related question arises in the cases where 
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there is an objective task and where the responding to it is 
constrained. It is this: Can changes in responding be 
evoked by presenting an unnoticed stimulus representing the 
goal response itself, as directly as possible, as contrasted 
with a stimulus which merely suggests a line of procedure 
in the task? 
Again we may analyze the Kolers experiment, 1 in almost 
but not quite the same terms. His incidentally presented clues 
operated as a suggestion or hint to S in his task of finding 
the common element among the supraliminal figures. He might, 
however, have presented (a symbol of) the response category, 
the choice of which was the goal of that task. Thus he might 
have presented FIGURE 2, where that was to have been the spo-
ken response. This would have constituted response dictation, 
circumventing S's attended processes of judgment. It would 
also have been a novel class of r:Cu&:, as described just above. 
In both these dimensions of the experimental situation, 
the differences are subtle and are matters of degree. In 
general, as they apply to cases where there is an objective 
task and constrained responding, there is no evidence that 
either the novel class of 'CUe or response dictation would 
prevent the appearance of the experimental effect. The fol-
lowing assumption is made for present purposes: If the ob-
jective judgments of Ss can be influenced by suggestions of 
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a readily assimilable class, they can also be influenced by 
dictations of a novel class. 
The affective element. Experimenters identified with 
the "New Look"l have shown an early and continuing interest 
in variations in perception as correlated with affective 
elements. Thus, of the objective-behaviorist studies cited 
in a preceding section, affect-related incidental stimuli 
were used in six,2,3,4,5,6, 7 while four others used stimuli 
1J. S. Bruner and G. S. Klein, Constraints in perception 
(paper presented at A.P.A. convention, 1959; ref., Amer. 
Psychologist, 14, 1959, 379). 
2G. s. Klein, D. P. Spence, R. R. Holt, and S. Gourevitch, 
Cognition without awareness: subliminal influence upon con-
scious thought, J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 57, 1958, 255-266. 
3 
4 
S. Bach and G. S. Klein, Conscious effects of prolonged 
subliminal exposures of words (paper presented at A.P.A. 
convention, 1957; abstract, Amer. Psychologist, 12, 1957, 
397). 
G. J. w. Smith, D. P. Spence, and G. S. Klein, Subliminal 
effects of verbal stimuli, J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 59, 
1959, 167-176. 
5P. A. Kolers, Subliminal stimulation in simple and com-
plex cognitive processes (Unpublished doctoral disser-
tation, New York Univer., 1956), Part I. 
6 ' M. Eagle, Effects of subliminal stimuli of aggressive con-
7 
tent upon conscious cognition, J. Pers., 27, 1959, 578-
600. 
N. F. Dixon, The effect of subliminal stimulation upon 
autonomic and verbal behavior, J. Abn. S~~chol., 
57' 1958, 29-36. 
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which were not intentionally affect-related.l,2,3,4 
It appears, therefore, that unnoticed stimuli may be 
the means of altering perceptions and discriminations, 
whether or not they are affect-related. In the present 
experiments, the stimuli used were not known to be sys-
tematically affect-related. 
1 c. W. Perky, An experimental study of imagination, Amer. J. 
Psychol., 21, 1910, 422-452. 
2J. G. Miller, Discrimination without awareness, Amer. J. 
3 
4 
Psychol., 52, 1939, 562-578. 
P. A. Kolers, Subliminal stimulation in problem-solving, 
Amer. _J. Psycho!.., 70, 1957, 437-441. 
F. H. Goldberg, H. Fiss, and G. S. Klein, Effects of an 
undiscriminated stimulus on imagery (paper presented at 
A.P.A. convention, 1959; abstract, Amer. Psychologis.t, 
14, 1959, 359). 
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a greater effect than one which is less closely relevant. 
Ideally, there would be available two clearly defined 
theoretical positions from which, at some point, contradic-
tory predictions could be derived. A crucial experiment 
would then allow one of the positions to be confirmed, the 
other infirmed, and understanding of the field to proceed 
with a bound. No such clear theoretical positions have been 
found with significant applications to the present area of 
research. The search for the limits of the kind of effect 
under study, however, can be guided by a general view of the 
nature of perception and thought. 
A view of percept-development. The view adopted here 
is that both percept-development and thought-developme~t pass 
"through a phase of symbolic and symbol-like presenta-
tions. These presentations are in part irrelevant to 
the thought concerned; fleeting and easily suppressed, 
they soon vanish, while what they lead to--the thought--
remains. Thus, from the point of view of thought, 
images are transitory stages. These images are very 
frequently symbolic. One might be inclined to consider 
even verbal images as transitory stages, since they too 
are only mediators of meaning."~ 
The presept writer would expand this passage to include 
percepts as well as thoughts. Both are implied by Klein's 
phrase, "cognitive behavior." 
As it applies to percepts, the view may be stated as 
follows: Transitory stages occur in the process from which 
a percept or a perceptual judgment develops. In such stages, 
1P. Schilder, On the development of thoughts, p. 505 (in D. 
Rapaport, Ed., Organization and Pathology of Thought, 1951). 
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weak as well as strong sensations and memories, especially 
those with meanings related to S's conscious and unconscious 
purposes, affect the development of percepts and perceptual 
judgments. 
The content of these transitory states and their mode 
of development may or may not be in accord with the real or 
consciously expected relations among things. They are usu-
ally not available to later recall. 
The percept or perceptual judgment, as a final product 
of this process, has a unitary quality and does not reflect 
the variety of sensations and memories which contributed to 
its development. 1 
A set of propositions. From this general conception 
of perceptual process, a set of propositions relative to 
perceptual judgment may be set forth: 
(Condition 1) If a normal mature S is required to perform 
a perceptual judgment (choice of a response class in 
accordance with the assi~nment of a stimulus situation 
to its appropriate class); 
(Condition 2) If sense data of classes a,b,c provide S with 
information relevant to the judgment, relevant in ways 
which S considers to be in accord with reality; 
(Condition 3) If sense data of classes d,e,f'provide S with 
information relevant to the judgment, but relevant in 
ways which S considers not in accord with reality; 
1Where the same percept or judgment would be arrived at 
through rational conscious examination of the sources of 
the transitory sta~~--sensations and memories--we say that 
the perceptual process has been integrative. Where it 
would be rejected through such conscious examination, we 
term the process syncretic. 
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Then: (Derivative l) The probability of occurrence of a 
given response class will be chiefly increased or de-
creased in accordance with the (absolute and relative) 
availability to S of data of classes a,b,c; 
(Hypothesis l) The probability of occurrence of a given 
response class will also be increased or decreased in 
accordance with the {absolute and relative) avail-
ability to S of data of classes d,e,f~ 
(Postulate l) The mature S has learned to minimize proba-
bility shifts of the kind referred to in Hypothesis 1. 
His minimization, or rejection of the associated in-
formation, is a part-function of his awareness of the 
existence of sense-data providing that information. 
Then: (Derivative 2) ~bere Sis unaware of the eXlstence 
of sense data of classes d,e,f, he is ~ss likely to 
minimize their effect; their availability will exert 
a greater increase or decrease upon the probability 
of occurrence of response classes than it does where 
he is aware of their existence.l 
(Definition) The more a class of information is found to 
increase or decrease the probability of a given re-
sponse, the more "relevant" it is said to be to that 
response. 
(Postulate 2) For the mature S, classes of sense data can 
be reliably ordered along gradients of relevancy of 
their information to a given perceptual judgment. 
{Postulate 3) Gradients of relevancy among data of classes 
d,e,f will be the same as the gradients of relevancy 
among precisely comparable data of classes a,b,c. 
Then: (Hypothesis 2) The increase or decrease of proba-
bility of occurrence of response classes due to data 
of classes d,e,f, which data are judged more relevant 
to the task, will be greater than that due to similar 
data Which are judged less relevant. 
In less formal terms: If we use the kind of incidental 
1
"we would suggest, tentatively, that because they did not 
reach awareness,, they [incidental stimulations] were rel-
atively effective in influencing reactions to the face." 
G.J.W. Smith, D.P. Spence, and G.S. Klein, Subliminal ef-
fects of verbal stimuli, J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 59, 1959, 
p. 175. Emphasis by original authors. 
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stimuli under discussion, but if we make some of them com-
paratively task-irrelevant, we expect to find these less ef-
fective in altering task responses. For example, a flashed 
word might be altered so as to become less legible. 
The Psychophysical Task 
The present experiment undertakes to test Hypothesis 1 
and Hypothasis 2 within the setting of a psychophysical task. 
In a psychophysical task, S is required to perform a 
strictly perceptual judgment (Condition 1). The sense data 
associated with the perceptual task provide information re-
levant to his judgments in ways he considers to be in accord 
with reality (Condition 2). It is possible to provide addi-
tional information relevant to the judgment, but relevant in 
ways which S will consider not to be in accord with reality 
(Condition 3). Such additional information can be provided 
while S is unaware of its existence; he should then be com-
paratively unlikely to minimize his response to it (Deriva-
tive 2). 
Then it is predicted that response to the psychophysical 
task will vary in accordance with the additional information 
supplied (Hypothesis 1). 
The additional information itself can be made more or 
less relevant to the psychophysical task (Postulate 2), in 
ways which are predictable from other data (Postulate 3). 
Then the effect predicted in Hypothesis 1 will be expected 
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to vary in accordance with the relevancy of the additional 
information (Hypothesis 2). 
As a psychophysical task the visual comparison of sizes 
of stimulus patches was selected. Incidental stimulation was 
by means of a brief flash immediately preceding the appear-
ance of the variable stimulus to be judged. The flash con-
sisted of a printed form of the words to be spoken by S as 
response: greater or smaller; or of a control (nonsense) 
flash. 
The prediction afforded by Hypothesis 1 then takes the 
form: Flashes of greater will be more frequently followed 
by judgments of "greater, 11 and flashes of smaller will be 
more frequently followed by judgments of "smaller, 11 than in 
the respective control conditions. 
It may be noted that this predicted effect will be most 
evident where the discrimination t~sk is most difficult. 
The most difficult case, by definition, occurs at the point 
of the physical scale where judgments are evenly divided. 
This defines the point of subjective equality (PSE) or point 
of maximum ambiguity. 1 At this point, none of the variance 
of responding is accounted for by genuine difference in the 
size of the patches. At the points where responding is al-
ways correct, all of the variance of responding is thus ac-
counted for. Thus the magnitude of effects upon responding 
1J. Hochberg, Perception: toward the recovery of a defini-
tion, Psychol. Rev., 63, 1956, 400-405. 
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due to any other factors to be studied is unequally limited 
at different points of the scale. In general, it is assumed 
that the magnitude of such effects will be roughly propor-
tional to the percentage of variance not accounted for by 
genuine patch size. 
As incidental stimuli which would be comparatively task-
irrelevant, misspelled versions of the words "greater" and 
"smaller 11 were chosen. Then the prediction afforded by Hy-
pothesis 2 takes the form: Flashes of greater (correctly 
spelled) will be more frequently followed by judgments of 
"greater" than will flashes of a misspelled version of greater; 
and similarly for smaller. 
In all cases, Ss were to be unaware of the existence 
of the incidental information carried by the flashes. In-
structions were such as to induce the set appropriate to a 
well-defined laboratory discrimination task, together with 
openness to any related but different stimulation which might 
appear. 
The measure used in testing these hypotheses was the 
frequency of responses of "greater" and 11smaller" under each 
set of conditions of stimulus patch and incidental stimula-
tion. In Experiment II (Chapter VI below), response laten-
cies were also examined in relation to agreement or disagree-
ment of response with incidental flash. The observation of 
latencies was considered merely exploratory, not requiring 
a structure of hypotheses and predictions. 
CHAPTER IV 
PRELIMINARY TEST 
In order to test Hypothesis 2 (Chapter III above), it 
was necessary to provide data of two classes, judged more 
and less relevant to the perceptual task being performed by 
S. The more relevant data were to take the form of the 
printed words greater and smaller. As less relevant data, 
it was proposed to use misspelled forms of these words. The 
forms graeter and samller were chosen after preliminary ex-
ploration. 
It was necessary, however, to establish that these forms 
were indeed, in the sense of the hjpothesis, less relevant 
to the responses than the correctly spelled forms. By the 
definition given in the series of propositions in Chapter 
III, this means that the stimulus graeter, for example, must 
be found to effect an increas.e in the probability of occur-
rence of the response "greater;" but that increase must be 
smaller than the similar increase effected by the stimulus 
greater. 
For the purpose of testing this statement by tachisto-
scopic means, it is translated as follows: The stimulus 
graeter must be found to evoke the response "greater, 11 but 
to do so at a higher physical threshold than does the stimu-
lus greater. 
The first part of the statement seemed adequately sup-
ported by generalization from past research dealing with the 
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misrecognition of altered stimuli. 1 ' 2 '3, 4 ,5, 6 But that such 
misrecognition would occur at a higher threshold than recog-
nition of the corresponding correctly spelled word was less 
clearly attested.7' 8 Hence it was thought necessary to use 
a direct empirical test. 
A standard procedure for threshold measurement (ascend-
ing series only) was employed. 
Apparatus 
A Dodge mirror-type tachistoscope was used, with a con-
stantly illuminated background and with the word stimuli 
illuminated for pre-set periods. These stimuli were prepared 
1H. M~sterberg, Beitr§ge zur experimentellen Psychologie, 
1892, iv, 22. 
2w. B. Pillsbury, A study in apperception, Amer. J. Psychol., 
8, 1897, 315-393. 
3M. C. in Rea din (the-
sis), 
4 M. D. Vernon, The Experimental Study of Reading, 1931. 
5E. M. Siipola, A group study of some effects of preparatory 
set, Psychol.Monog., 46, No.6, 1935, 27-38. 
6D F. Wyatt and D. T. Campbell, On the liability of stereo-
tyPe or hypothesis, J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 46, 1951, 496-
500. 
7L. PQ.stman, J. S. Bruner, and R. D. Walk, The perception 
of error, Brit. J. Psychol., 42, 1951, 1-10. 
8J. S. Bruner and L. Postman, On the perception of incongru-
ity: a paradigm, J. Pers., 18, 1949, 206-223. 
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in the form of phot~phic transparencies mounted in 3-1/4 
inch by 4-inch slides, evenly transilluminated by the timed 
lamps. 
In order that the correctly spelled words might be 
highly recognizable, the use of a fairly legible type face 
was indicated. 1 Throughout the series of experiments, a 
boldface Roman lower-case display type with square serifs 
was used. 2 Words made up from this type were photographed 
so as to produce a negative with highly opaque ground and 
transparent letters. A strip of acetate fastened to each 
slide formed a handle for inserting it into the appropriate 
slot in the tachistoscope. 
The correct and misspelled forms of greater and smaller 
have been mentioned. In order to make up a longer list and 
also to remind Ss that they might or might not be seeing 
English dictionary words, five more six-letter words were 
added as follows: become, steers, mossia, terval, and ksojwu. 
Mossia and terval are "fourth-order approximations of Eng-
lish" adapted from Miller, Bruner, and Postman.3 
1In contrast, the majority of experiments in this field have 
used typewritten capitals, which are comparatively illegible. 
(See D. G. Paterson ana M. A. Tinker, How to Make Type Read-
~' 1940.) 
2Para-Tipe #85; Para-Tone, Inc., Chi~ago, Ill., (obtainable 
at commercial art supply stores). 
3G. A. Miller, J. s. Bruner, and L. Postman, Familiarity of 
letter sequences and tachistoscopic identification, J. Gen. 
Psychol., 50, 1954, 129-139. 
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Subjects 
The Ss were 15 male volunteers, ranging in age from 19 
to 32. All but one were students at Boston University summer 
sessions. The median age was 25. All had approximately 
normal visual acuity, in some cases by the use of corrective 
lenses. They were paid for their services. 
Procedure 
After dark-adaptation, S was told that E was interested 
in measuring the legibility of certain stimulus slides. S 
was to watch for the group of letters which would appear for 
a brief fraction of a second after the warning signal, and 
was to report whatever he saw or thought he saw. It was 
emphasized that any group of letters might or might not be 
the correct spelling of an English word. 
For each S an individual sequence of the nine stimulus 
words had been obtained from a table of random numbers. 
Each slide was exposed three times at a given duration. The 
duration of exposure began at six milliseconds and was in-
creased by three milliseconds after each series of slides 
was shown. vVhen S reported a slide accurately for each of 
the three exposures at a given duration, the slide was re-
moved from the series. Testing was continued until this 
criterion was met for each word, except thav where the word 
ksojwu was the last to be recognized, the procedure was ter-
minated without obtaining its recognition threshold. 
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Results 
The nine stimulus words employed are shown below, with 
their mean thresholds (in milliseconds) for a single correct 
call: 
smaller 13.6 
samller 52.9 
greater 
graeter 
16.2 
32.2 
become 
mossia 
15.8 steers 15.4 
27.0 terval 19.8 
ksojwu 40.6 (not comparable to other thresholds) 
For a single "predicted miscall," thresholds were as 
follows: 
samller miscalled as "smaller:" 21.2 
graeter miscalled as "greater:" 18.8 
Can we affirm that the misspelled words evoke the re-
sponses of "smaller" and "greater" but at higher thresholds 
than do the correctly spelled words? Every S made these 
predicted miscalls at least twice before correctly reading 
the misspelled words. No S made the predicted miscall of 
graeter at a lower duration ·than his correct report of greater. 
Only two Ss made the predicted miscall of samller at lower 
durations than their correct reports of smaller. According 
to Wilcoxon's non-parametric test for paired replicates, 1 
all of the predicted threshold differences are significant 
at well beyond the one per cent level. 
1s. Siegel, Non-Parametric Statistics for the Behavioral 
Sciences, 1956, PP• 75-83. 
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Summary 
In a standard procedure for threshold measurement, the 
stimuli graeter and samller were found to evoke the responses 
"greater" and "smaller," but to do so at higher physical 
threshold values than do the correctly spelled stimuli. The 
misspelled stimulus words, therefore, are concluded to be 
relevant to a task with responses "greater" and "smaller," 
but relevant in a lesser degree than the correctly spelled 
stimulus words. 
CHAPTER V 
EXPERIMENT I 
The purpose of the experiment was to study performance 
in a visual size comparison task as a function of the mean-
ings of words presented as unnoticed incidental stimuli. 
These stimulus words included both more and less recognizable 
impressions of the prescribed response words "greater" and 
"smaller." 
Apparatus 
The Boston University Tachistoscope #2 (Dodge type) 
was employed. Its associated electronic timer was modified 
so that, when the trigger circuit was actuated, the A-stimulus 
field1 was illuminated for a pre-set timed period; at the end 
of this period, the A-stimulus lamps were extinguished and 
the B-stimulus field was immediately illuminated (monostable 
multi-vibrator action). 
A motor-driven switching timer and relays were used to 
control the over-all sequence of a trial, which was as fol-
lows: 
1. Warning buzzer 
2. Standard-size rectangle illuminated--three seconds 
3. Blank--four seconds 
1It is customary to letter the stimuli in the order of their 
appearance in a cycle or trial. Here the A-stimulus was 
the incidental stimulus; the B-stimulus was the patch whose 
size was to be judged. 
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4. Incidental stimulus illuminated--11 to 16 millisec. 
5. Variable rectangle illuminated--3-1/2 seconds 
6. Blank--15 to 30 seconds 
Modification of the timer permitted E to vary not only 
the duration of the incidental stimulus but the current, 
hence the brightness,of both stimuli. The probability of 
the incidental stimulus being noticed hae been found to in-
crease, not only as its own duration and brightness were in-
creased, but also as the brightness of the succeeding stimu-
lus (variable rectangle) was decreased. It was planned to 
make the incidental stimulation gradually more noticeable 
during the course of the experiment. This was done because 
it appeared from preliminary data that many Ss, after a 
period of observing in the task, could work with a higher 
relative level of flash stimulation without noticing it. 
For this purpose, occasional slight reductions of brightness 
of the rectangle were made. 
During the blank periods, the field was totally dark. 
The stimuli for visual comparison were presented by 
means of 3-1/4-inch by 4-inch slides, with the fields opaque 
and the figures transparent so as. ·to allow transillumination 
from an evenly backlighted ground-glass surface. The stan-
dard or comparison stimulus figure was a rectangle or patch 
of a fine checkerboard pattern, 59 by 77.5 mm., with the 
longer dimension vertical. The eleven slides used to pre-
sent the variable stimulus were identical, ex~ept that the 
Cl 
a:: 
0 
~ (/J 
_, LaJ 
< 0 
.... ~ 
_Z _. 
LaJ (/J 
0 
-
(/) 
0 :::J 
:z: _J 
-
:::J 
:1 
-
.... 
en 
LiJ 
..J 
a. 
2 
< (/) 
&&I 
_. 
~ 
z 
·c:c 
.... 
• ~ 0 
LiJ L&J a::: a: 
0 
:::;, 
a::: ~ 
< -
0 I.&.. 
z 
< 
t-
en 
46 
size of the rectangle ranbed in equal steps from 57 by 75 
mm. to 60.5 by 80 mm. Research1 had indicated that with 
such a stimulus the constant error or time error should 
approximate zero with the timing to be effiployed. 
The unnoticed incidental stimuli were likewise pre-
sented by means of transparencies. They consisted of the 
words greater, smaller, graeter, samller, and a nonsense 
figure approximately equal in size and shape to the words 
(about 50 by 15 mm. over-all). Any one of these could be 
inserted into the A (flash) field of the tachistoscope; any 
of the slides bearing rectangular patches could be inserted 
into the B field. If both fields were illuminated, the word 
appeared plainly written across the middle of the patch. 
The viewing distance was 60 em.; hence the visual angle 
subtended by the standard stimulus was about 6° by 7°. 
E inserted and removed all slides by hand. In the 
event of a delay in changing slides or in recording data, 
the next trial sequence did not begin until E triggered it 
by means of a pedal. 
Subjects 
Subjects were four male undergraduates with normal 
vision, their ages ranging from 19 to 24. None of them 
was generally sophisticated in the field of psychology; 
(Unpublished 
none suspected the purpose of the experiment. They were 
paid for their services. 
Such a small number of Ss is unusual in research on 
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unnoticed incidental stimulation. The present experiment, 
however, was considered as a study of an effect in psycho-
physics, with rather detailed examination of the data pro-
vided by individual Ss; in such a setting, the use of few Ss 
is appropriate. It was supposed that the effect sought, 
like most known psychophysical effects, could be elicited 
in some degree from any normal individual. 
A further discussion of this point will be undertaken 
below in the discussion of results (page 57). 
Procedure 
A formal approach to S with minimal contact and with 
verbatim reading of instructions appears to heighten anxiety 
in some Ss and to prevent such subtle influences as are here 
sought. 1 ' 2 Accordingly, E attempted to put S at ease before 
and during the experiment. He chatted informally, clarified 
to S that the latter was not in any sense being tested, and 
liberally paraphrased the instructions. 
A preliminary technique was used to estimate S's thresh-
old for the incidental stimulation. This employed the 
1P. A. Kolers, Subliminal stimulation in sim le and com lex 
cognitive processes Unpu doctora dlssertatlon, 
New York Univer., 1956). 
2c. M. Solley and J. Long, When is "uh-huh" reinforcing?, 
Percept. Mot. Skills, 8, 1958, 277. 
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meta contrast', effect, a sort of variant of apparent move-
ment.1 A solid circle of light was the main stimulus, re-
maining on for several seconds at each presentation; it was 
preceded very briefly by a broad ring which surrounded the 
circle. The duration of the ring and the intensity of the 
circle were varied so as to obtain values at which the ring 
seemed to shrink into the circle. These values were then 
used initially in the main procedure. 
The purpose and procedure of a psychophysical experi-
ment according to the method of constant stimulus differences 
were explained to s. On each trial, following the warning 
buzzer, he would be shown first the standard and then one of 
the variable patches. At any time after the appearance of 
the variable, he was to report his judgment as to its size 
compared with the standard, using the word "greater" or 
"smaller."2 No judgments of "equal" were to be used. It 
would not be possible to distinguish the patches by their 
shapes or patterns. The task was difficult; much of the 
time S would be very uncertain, but he was to do his best 
and not to worry about his accuracy. 
E added that the electronic equipment might accidentally 
1M. Alpern, Metacontrast, Qpt. Soc. Amer. J., 43, 1953, 648-
657· 
2Although the instructions specified use of the words "great-
er" and "smaller," and these were used at all times byE, 
S was not corrected if he used different words. Some Ss 
used 11 larger 11 part of the time. 
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become erratic, in which case some additional stimulation 
would be visible. If this should occur, S was to report it 
to E. S was reminded of this request, in a casual manner, 
at some time during every experimental hour. 
Prior to the beginning of every session, S was dark-
adapted for 10 to 20 minutes. 
Order of stimuli. The variable stimuli or patches were 
numbered from one (smallest) to 11 (lar~~est); Fo. 6 was 
identical in size to the standard. The experiment was de-
signed to measure the effect of the unrecognized words smal-
ler and samller upon judgments of Nos. 1-5, the effect ot 
greater and graeter upon Nos. 7-11, and the effect of both 
upon No. 6. Each presentation of a word as unrecognized 
flash stimulus was to be matched by a similar presentation 
of the nonsense flash stimulus as control. A full series, 
therefore, included 12 presentations of the variable stimuli 
with the correctly spelled flash stimuli; 12 presentations 
with the misspelled flash stimuli; and 24 presentations with 
the nonsense flash stimulus. 
Some previous experimentation1 had indicated that, under 
some conditions, only the third or fourth consecutive pre-
sentation of the same unrecognized stimulus might be effec-
tive; i.e., a positive recency effect obtained. Accordingly, 
1G. J. W. Smith, D. P. Spence, and G. S. Klein, Subliminal 
effects of verbal stimuli, J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 59, 1959, 
167-176. 
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the order of presentation was built of blocks of three 
greater or three smaller than standard. Each of the patches 
of a single block was preceded by the same flash stimulus. 
To avoid following an unvarying pattern of three-greater-
three-smaller, there was a run of six either greater or 
smaller in the middle of each series of 24 trials. Within 
these limitations, the order was randomly drawn. (See Ap-
pendix A for a typical series.) 
A brief rest period was afforded after each series of 
24 trials. Ninety-six trials normally constituted an hour's 
session. The intensity of the visible stimulus patches was 
gradually decreased from hour to hour, so that the flash 
stimuli became relatively more recognizable. The procedure 
was continued to a total of 1,536 trials with each s, except 
for one who reported seeing the flash stimulus after complet-
ing 1,152 judgments. 
Aural identification of incidental-stimulus slide. As 
a part of the regular procedure for every trial, one of the 
five A-stimulus slides bearing the incidental stimuli was 
inserted into and removed from the tachistoscope. The sound 
of its doing so was audible to S, along with the various 
other sounds of the apparatus. It is possible that S might 
learn to associate the characteristic sound of, say, the 
sreater slide with the probability of occurrence of patches 
easily judged greater than standard. 
A priori, it may be pointed out that the timing of a 
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cycle was such as to make this association unlikely: Inser-
tion of the A-stimulus slide preceded the warning signal, 
and its sound would probably be experienced as a part of the 
previous cycle. Moreover, care was taken to reduce the in-
dividually identifiable characteristics of these sounds in 
relation to their over-all variability. 
Nevertheless, it was thought desirable to test Ss' abil-
ity to recognize the A-stimulus slides by sound alone. A 
matching test was used, employing the four meaningful A~ 
stimulus slides. After S had finished the entire psychophy-
sical series, he was told that he was to try to distinguish 
four slides by the characteristic sounds they made in enter-
ing and leaving the exposure chamber. He listened to three 
repetitions of each, identified for him by their designating 
letters. He then attempted, after each of a series of eight 
trials, to report which of the slides had been used. This 
procedure--identified presentations followed by test--was 
repeated a second and a third time. 1 
Finally, the nature of the experiment was disclosed to 
S and was further discussed with him. 
1rt will be noted that there·is some opportuhity for learn-
ing to occur during this test itself, even though none may 
have occurred during the psychophysical procedure. Thus 
the argument from null results here to rejection of aural 
association as a factor in producing the predicted effect 
(if any) in the psychophysical procedure is a fortiori. 
52 
Results 
Aural identification. In trying to distinguish the 
four A-stimulus slides by sound alone, the three Ss achieved 
20.3 per cent hits compared with a chance expectation of 25 
per cent. Hence no evidence appears that they could success-
fully associate the sounds of these slides with the proba-
bilities of appearance of larger or smaller patches. 
Recency effect. Arranging the stimuli in blocks of 
three greater and three smaller than standard introduced a 
non-random source of error describable as recency effect; 
i.e., the tendency, when S has judged the last one or two 
or three stimuli as greater, to judge the next as either 
greater (positive effect) or smaller (negative effect). 1 ' 2 
This effect was not taken into account in establishing 
the order of stimuli for the first s. There proved to be a 
marked negative recency effect, which for this S was con-
founded with the predicted effects so that the data were 
useless for the intended purpose. For the other three Ss, 
the series of 24 trials were counterbalanced so as to neu-
tralize this effect. 
Group results. With only three Ss and with a large 
1c. I. Howarth and M. G. Bulmer, Non-random sequences in 
visual threshold experiments, Quart. J. Exp· Psychol., 8, 
1956, 163-171. 
2J. s. Bruner and H. Wechsler, Sequential probability as a 
determinant of perceptual closure, Amer. J. Psychol., 71, 
1958, 604-606. 
number of trials apiece, it is appropriate to examine the 
data from each S individually. However, the psychometric 
functions pooling data from the three Ss and reflecting a 
group test of the main hypothesis are also instructive. 
In Figure 5, the ordinate represents per cent of judg-
ments at each stimulus size which were correct, rather than 
the more conventional per cent of judgments of "greater" 
throughout the scale. Thus, half of the conventional ogive 
function has been inverted. 
The solid line represents all trials with the control 
flash stimulus. The broken line represents all trials with 
the experimental word stimuli, both correctly spelled and 
misspelled. It should be noted that there are four entries 
for stimulus No. 6 (equal to standard): one for trials with 
smaller and samller, one for trials with greater and graeter, 
and one each for the sets of control trials which precisely 
match the above in terms of sequential location. 
The general prediction is that accuracy for experimental 
stimuli is superior to that for control stimuli. It is ap-
parent in Figure 5 that, across the full range of stimulus 
sizes, the data do not bear out this prediction. 
If we consider only the four stimulus conditions nearest 
the middle of the range--closest to the point of subjective 
equality--we note that they do consistently favor the pre-
diction. Since it had been expected that the experimental 
effect would be most evident where the objective discrimination 
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task was most difficult, it is appropriate to test the sig-
nificance of this effect. The test was made by means of an 
analysis of variance, which is detailed in Appendix C. The 
magnitude of the predicted effect was found to be such as 
might have arisen by chance. 
Individual results. When the data for the three Ss 
were examined individually, for none of the three did there 
appear a consistent increase in accuracy associated with the 
presence of the meaningful flash stimuli, across all 12 con-
ditions of patch size. 
One S (the same who reported seeing the flash after 
completing three fourths of the planned series of trials) 
yielded statistically significant agreement with the flash 
stimulation when it accompanied the stimulus patch of mid-
size. However, in view of the large number of such tests 
which might be made and of the great variability of data 
from this S, this result can hardly be said to support the 
psychological hypothesis. 
As one would expect from the failure of the combined 
results to follow the predicted pattern, there was no sys-
tematic difference between results obtained with the cor-
rectly spelled and the misspelled flash stimuli. 
Discussion 
~mjor hypothesis. The major hypothesis of the present 
study was that, in a psychophysical task of the kind employed, 
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flashes of greater would be more frequently followed by 
judgments of t•greater," and flashes of smaller more frequent-
ly followed by judgments of "smaller," than in the comparable 
control conditions. For three Ss, tested over a large number 
of trials each, no such influence was found. 
Second hypothesis. It was :predicted that the effect of 
correctly spelled words used as unnoticed incidental stimu-
lation would be greater than would the effect of the same 
words in misspelled form. Since Experiment I failed to yield 
any main effect, it could not yield this differential effect. 
In reviewing the experiment, possible reasons for the 
failure to demonstrate the hypothesized influence were con-
sidered. First, of course, the influence might be non-
existent. If this were so, it would be difficult to explain 
why such an influence has appeared in experimental :procedures 
which do not seem radically different from the present one. 
Thus, on grounds of theoretical parsimony, this explanation 
of the failure was not immediately accepted. 
Second, an inadequate technique was used for predicting 
the physical value of incidental stimulation at which the 
individual S will first recognize its existence. The level 
was set by a rough :procedure and was raised only, a little1 
1Actually, as explained in connection with the description 
of the apparatus, the brightness of the judgment pat€.hes 
was reduced while the duration and brightness of the inci-
dental stimulation remained the same. 
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during the series of trials constituting Experiment I. It 
reached the level of recognition for one of the Ss; for the 
others, it may have been set far too low. 
Whether a method exists which will enable accurate pre-
dictions of the recognition level under the conditions of 
this experiment may be doubted. An improved technique would 
permit the collection of responses from every S while the 
incidental stimulus was at a physical level only a little 
below the level of recognition. 
Third, only three Ss were used. The decision to use 
such a small number was mentioned above (p. 47). It had been 
assumed that the effect sought, like most known psychophysi-
cal effects, could be observed in most normal individuals. 
Previous experimentation had, indeed, shown a rather 
wide range of degree of effect from unnoticed incidental 
stimulation: some Ss failed to show the predicted effect 
and some showed a reverse effect. Some authors 1 ' 2 '3 have 
conjectured that there is a meru1ingful dichotomy between Ss 
who do and those who do not respond to stimulation without 
1P. A. Kolers, Subliminal stimulation in simple and complex 
cognitive processes (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
New York Univer., 1956). 
2s. Bach and G.S. Klein, Conscious effects of prolonged sub-
liminal exposures of words (paper presented at A.P.A. con-
vention, 195'7; abstract, Amer. Psychologist, 12, 1957, 397). 
3n. Spence and I. Paul, Importation above and below aware-
ness (paper presented at A.P~A. convention, 1959; abstract, 
Amer. Psychologist, 14, 1959, 359). 
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awareness. At least one1 has sought out personality corre-
lates of this dimension of responsiveness. Certain consid-
erations, however, make the existence of such a dichotomy 
dubious. (A) It has not been shown that Ss who are respon-
sive in a given procedure will continue to be so in retests 
or in similar subsequent procedures. (B) As suggested above, 
there seems to be no efficient technique for predicting the 
physical level of incidental stimulation at which the indiv-
idual S will first recognize its existence. In practice, E 
probably uses E'OSt of the time a value well below the recog-
nition level. This would account for failure to obtain. re-
sults from Ss who may actually be responsive. (C) The dicho-
tomy has been announced only on the basis of experimentation 
with affect-laden incidental stimuli. But with regard to 
such stimuli, it seems clear from previous work2 that recog-
nition thresholds vary in accordance with the affective na-
ture of the stimuli. The dichotomy n;.ay not hold where affec-
tively neutral stimuli are used. 
Fourth, Ss were looking into a totally dark tachisto-
scope except when one or another stimulus patch was illumi-
nated. Ss renorted that this condition was experienced as 
unpleasant. It may well have caused a greater general 
1M. Eagle, Some personality correlates of responsiveness to 
unperceived cues (paper presented at A.P.A. convention, 
1959; abstract, Amer. Psychologist, 14, 1959, 359). 
2c. W. Eriksen, Defense against ego-threat in memory and 
perception, J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 47, 1952, 230-235. 
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variability in judgments of stimulus sizes than would other-
wise have obtained. If so, any effects correlated with the 
nature of the unnoticee incidental stimuli would have been 
the more likely to go undetected against the large background 
variation. 
It seemed, therefore, that a further test of Hypothesis 
1 should be attempted. A revised procedure should permit 
the collection of responses from each S while the incidental 
stimulus was at a physical level only a little below the 
level of recognition; should use an adequate number of Ss 
to allow for the possibility that many are non-responsive to 
stimulation without awareness; and should avoid the use of a 
totally dark background. 
Summary 
Three Ss judged the sizes of 11 stimulus patches over 
a lengthy series of trials according to the method of con-
stant stimulus differences. The appearance of each variable 
patch was preceded by a brief unnoticed flash bearing either 
the word greater, the word smaller, a misspelling of one of 
these, or a nonsense stimulus. The same unnoticed stimulus 
was used for three consecutive trials. Between stimulations, 
the stimulus field was totally dark .• 
With the orders of stimuli fully counterbalanced, there 
was no demonstrable tendency for flashes of greater or smal-
ler or misspelled versions of them to evoke from S the cor-
responding judgments. Possible reasons for this outcome 
have been discussed. 
CHAPTER VI 
EUERIMENT II 
As. in Experiment I, the purpose was to study perfor-
mance in a visual size comparison task as correlated with 
the meanings of the response words presented as unnoticed 
incidental stimuli. A further purpose, in the event of such 
a correlation being found, was to study the relation between 
latency of response and agreement with such meanings. 
The considerations outlined in the discussion of Ex-
periment I (Chapte~ V), served to indicate certain desirable 
features of the design of Experiment II. First, the inci-
dental stimuli employed for each S should, ideally, be at a 
physical level just below that at which recognition would 
occur. This would avoid the use of a level so low that S 
might not be able to discriminate among the stimuli, even 
with full awareness. 
No known procedure for estimating the level o~ recog-
nition in advance was thought to be satisfactory for this 
purpose. The solution employed was to use a rather conser-
vatively estimated value for the initial level of the inci-
dental stimulation and then to increase the level systematic-
ally until recognition occurred. Then the responses to be 
analyzed were the last of the series, those which preceded 
by only a few trials the first reported partial recognition. 
This procedure had the economic disadvantage that the responses 
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to earlier trials--hundreas, iu come cases--had to be dis-
regarded. 
Second, the number of Ss to be used should be sufficient 
to demonstrate the hypothesized effect at a statistically 
significant level. This effect might occur, according to 
previous research, in as few as 30 percent of Ss, and was 
probably only moderately strong in the individuals of that 
minority. Because these factors could not be more exactly 
estimated, it was not possible to use operating characteris-
tics of statistical tests to derive precisely an appropriate 
n. The operating characteristic of the ~-test to be used, 
however, did suggest that there would be little advantage 
(that is, little reduction in the chance of accepting a false 
null hypothesis) in using more than about 30 Ss. 
Third, it appeared that the viewing field should not 
be totally dark between the presentations of patches. 
The second hypothesis of Experiment I predicted a dif-
ference in accuracy from the use of more and less recogniz-
able versions of the unnoticed incidental stimuli. In Ex-
periment II, this difference was not tested. To have tested 
it would have doubled the length of the procedure, which was 
already so great with many of the Ss as to raise problems of 
scheduling. It seemed preferable to test the first hypothe-
sis as directly as possible, while relinquishing the effort 
to test the second in the same setting. 
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Also, the major effort in Experiment II was directed 
toward testing the effect at a point on the stimulus size 
scale close to the point of subjective equality. As men-
tioned in Chapter III, this is the point where none of the 
variance of responding is accounted for by genuine differ-
ence in patch size. Hence the predicted variance due to 
unnoticed incidental stimuli should appear there if anywhere. 
In Experiment II, latency of responding was studied in 
relation to Ss' agreement with the message of the unnoticed 
incidental stimuli. In psychophysics generally, accurate 
judgments are found to be made more rapidly than inaccurate 
judgments. Some experimenters, however, report that judg-
ments agreeing with unnoticed incidental stimulation may be 
made more slowly than their opposites. An extended analysis 
of this subject will be deferred to the discussion of re-
sults in this chapter. 
Finally, Experiment II was designed to test for differ-
ences of responding correlated with sex of s. The most 
closely comparable inquiries have not indicated that either 
sex is more sensitive than the other to unperceived stimu-
lation.1 However, in order to test this factor, equal num-
bers of male and female Ss were employed. 
1In some cases where both male and female Ss were used, pub-
lished reports have so far dealt only with those of one 
sex: G. J. w. Smith and u. Kragh, Do microgenetic sequences 
reflect life history? An illustration, Acta Psfchol., 11, 
1955, 504-512; M. Eagle, Some personality corre ates of re-
sponsiveness to unperceived cues (paper presented at A.P.A. 
convention, 1959; abstract, Amer. Psychologist, 14, 1959, 
359). 
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Apparatus 
The tachistoscope was used in the same fashion as in 
the first experiment, with the following changes: Brightness 
of the transilluminated surface behind the rectangular patch-
es was 2.06 foot-lamberts, as seen from the viewing window, 
on every appearance of these patches. In the other field of 
the tachistoscope, a sheet of tracing paper ten inches by 
ten inches was inserted, its front surface illuminated by 
two shaded 6-volt lamps to a brightness of about 0.001 foot-
lamberts as seen from the viewing window. Being visible at 
all times, this surface provided a frame within which the 
stimulus patches (about 2-1/3 by 3-1/4 inches) appeared. 
It was expected that judgments made with this constant-
ly visible background would be less variable than those made, 
as in Experiment I, against a totally dark background. Ss 
could more readily judge the distance of the images, and 
autokinetic effects would be minimized. 
It was also possible, however, for S to use the back-
ground to try to circumvent the judgment task. While the 
standard stimulus was in view, he could fixate a spot on the 
background which coincided with its edge. Then, when the 
variable appeared, he would make his judgment according to 
whether the variable overlapped or fell short of this spot. 
In order to nullify the advantage to S of using such a tech-
nique, each patch was centered at a slightly different spot. 
This was explained to S, and it was emphasized that he could 
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judge with accuracy only by looking at the whole patch and 
attending to his impression of its total size. 
The slides bearing transparencies of the incidental 
stimulus words could be inserted in a holder immediately 
behind the sheet of tracing paper. They were transillumi-
nated by light from a 1/3 by 1/3 inch uncovered portion of 
the surface of a single 4-watt fluorescent lamp, 23 inches 
behind the sheet, drawing a current of 53 milliamperes from 
the timed circuit of the timer. This constituted a lensless 
projector, affording a fairly sharp image of the slide trans-
parency on the tracing paper. Its brightness was 0.014 foot-
lamberts as seen from the viewing window. 
Latency of response was recorded by means of a Gerbrands 
electronic voice key. A Standard timer (stop-clock) was 
started when the incidental stimulus was illuminated, just 
before the variable patch. When S spoke his response into 
a microphone attached below the viewing hood, the timer was 
stopped by means of the voice key. 
Subjects 
There were 16 male and 16 female Ss, either high school 
graduates or college graduates; their ages ranged from 17 to 
24. Five of them had some degree of sophistication in the 
field of psychology, but none guessed the purpose of the 
experiment. All had normal vision. They received pay for 
their services. 
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Procedure 
Again a preliminary procedure was employed to establish 
a beginning value for the incidental stimulation. This was 
a different procedure from that used in Experiment I, seem-
ing (on the basis of some exploratory work) to offer a more 
sensitive indicator of the level at which S would recognize 
the flashed words. A broad ring of light was the main stim-
ulus, which remained on for several seconds at each presen-
tation. Preceding it for a brief timed period was a complex 
pattern located within the ring, and including two bright 
spots adjacent to the ring on the right and left. The dura-
tion of this stimulus was varied so as to obtain ascending 
and descending thresholds for the appearance of both spots. 
From these was derived a value for the initial duration of 
the flash stimulus in the main procedure. 
Following this preliminary procedure, S was led to an-
other room where he was asked to produce stories to four TAT 
cards, recording them by means of a tape recorder. 1 
S then returned to the experimental room for the psy-
chophysical task itself. The instructions he received were 
essentially the same as those of the first experiment, with 
the addition not~d previously in connection with the lighted 
background. Also, S was asked to speak his responses clearly 
1These data were collected in order to test hypotheses re-
lating to personality characteristics of Ss influenced by 
the incidental stimulation. They are to be treated in a 
separate report. 
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into tne microphone mounted below the viewing aperture, 
since this would be used to obtain his response time. How-
ever, he was told that he need not make any effort to re-
spond either more quickly or more slowly because of the time 
recording. 
Instead of using the buzzer as a warning signal, as in 
Experiment I, E said the word "ready" about one second be-
fore the appearance of the standard patch. 
Order of stimuli. The attempt to take advantage of a 
(possible) positive recency effect by using blocks of three 
consecutive stimuli greater or smaller than standard (as 
described in Chapter V) was abandoned in this experiment. 
A modified random order of stimuli was used instead. 
Each series of 20 trials included Stimulus No. 6 (equal 
in size to the standard) presented six times with the inci-
dental greater and six times with smaller; Stimuli Nos. 2 
and 4 presented once each with smaller and once each with 
the nonsense stimulus; and Stimuli Nos. 8 and 11 presented 
once each with greater and once each with the nonsense stim-
ulus. These patches were chosen because, on the group psy-
chophysical judgment curve generated in Experiment I, they 
afforded tasks of two distinct difficulty levels on either 
side of the point of equality. The latter point appeared to 
lie quite close to Stimulus No. 6; that is, t;he constant 
error or time error was near zero, as had been expected. 
Four orders of the 20 trials were drawn from a table of 
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random numbers; then four more orders were created by sub-
stituting No. 6-- smaller for No. 6--greater (and vice versa) 
throughout the original four orders. The eight orders were 
presented in rotation to each s. 
S was given a brief rest period after eacn series of 
20 trials. Usually about 80 trials were performed in an 
hour's session. 
The duration of the flash stimulus remained at its ini-
tial value for the first 40 trials. It was then increased 
by one millisecond every ten trials for three such increases; 
thereafter by one millisecond every five trials up to a level 
of 50 milliseconds; thereafter by one millisecond every three 
trials. The procedure was discontinued at a level of 100 
milliseconds, if recognition had not previously occurred. 
The selector switches that govern flash duration were muted 
so as to avoid giving an audible suggestion to S that dura-
tion values were being increased (as they had been during 
the preliminary procedure). 
Recognition was judged to have occurred when S reported 
a· localized flash preceding the variable patch, whether or 
not he perceived it as printed letters; a report of a broad 
or vague flash covering most of the patch area was not con-
sidered recognition. E tried to ascertain as exactly as 
possible the first trial on which recognition had occurred; 
usually this was from two to five trials before the report 
by s. 
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Aural identification. Again, as in Experiment I, it 
is possible that Ss might learn to associate the sound of 
the greater slide entering or leaving its slot with the ap-
pearance of patches easily judged greater than standard. 
As in Experiment I, a brief procedure was run to test 
for this kind of association, using six of the 32 Ss. These 
Ss were selected because they had time to continue with this 
procedure after finishing the psychophysical task. Their 
mean combined accuracy score for the main task was 12.5, 
compared with a mean over all 32 Ss of 13.25. 
S was told that he was to try to distinguish two slides 
by the sounds that they made in entering and leaving the 
exposure chamber. He listened to four repetitions of the 
sounds, designated as Number One and Number Two. He then 
attempted, after each of a series of ten trials, to report 
which of the two slides had been used. He was given two more 
identified repetitions of each, and finally another series 
of ten trials. 
Finally, the nature of the experiment was disclosed to 
each of the Ss and was discussed further with those who 
showed an interest. Ss almost invariably displayed consid-
erable surprise on finding that the incidental stimulus had 
been present throughout the psychophysical procedure. 
With eight Ss, as time allowed, quick checks were made 
to determine the thresholds for reading the flash stimuli 
and for identifying their presence, with S sophisticated as 
?0 
to their existence. 
Results 
Aural identification. The six Ss who tried to distin-
guish two stimulus slides by their sound achieved a total 
of 62 hits, compared with a chance expectation of 60. Using 
the appropriate matching test, 1 it was found that such a 
result might very easily have occurred by chance (p#0.39). 
Thus, Ss who have already frequently heard these slides be-
ing inserted do not appear able to distinguish them by their 
sounds alone, even under favorable conditions for doing so. 
Duration levels. The beginning level of duration of 
the incidental stimuli ranged from 22 to 39 milliseconds. 
The level at recognition ranged from 31 to about 180 (three 
Ss who did not report the stimulation at the final level of 
100 milliseconds were tested beyond that level, using large 
duration increments). 
The eight Ss whose thresholds were checked in the soph-
isticated condition were able to detect the presence of the 
flash stimuli at 20 to 35 milliseconds, and to distinguish 
one from another at 30 to 60 milliseconds. 
The measures. As indicated above, E ascertained as 
precisely as possible the trial on which recognition had 
first occurred. All trials at that level of flash duration 
1F. Mosteller and R. R. Bus), Selected quantitative techniques 
(in G. Lindzeyt Ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, 1954, 
Vol. I, P• 310;. 
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were disregarded, and 40 previous responses were analyzed. 
These included the last 12 presentations of the mid-stimulus 
(No. 6) with the smaller flash, its last 12 presentations 
with greater, and for each of the four other stimuli its 
last two presentations with a meaningful flash and its last 
two with the control flash. 
Mid-stimulus: accuracy. Each S obtained one score 
representing his number of calls of "greater" out of 12 
trials with this incidental stimulus, and another represent-
ing his calls of "smaller" out of the 12 with smaller. In 
Figures? and 8 are plotted the frequency distributions of 
these two scores, and in Figure 9 the distribution of sub-
jects' total accuracy scores, combining the two. 
The extent to which the curves lie to the right of the 
50 per cent point is a measure of Ss' agreement with the 
incidental stimuli. The extent to which the curve of Figure 
? lies to the right of the curve of Figure 8 is a measure of 
constant error or (negative) time-error; i.e., the tendency 
to call the variable patch greater than standard. 
To test the significance of the degree of agreement 
with incidental stimuli, the appropriate matching technique1 
was used. The "target deck'' has two suits of 12 cards each. 
The matching deck has the same suits but no restriction as 
to the number of cards per suit. Variance is computed 
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separately for each of the 32 Ss; then for the overall test: 
Z -- total correct matches - (32 x 12) =2 • 98 • JL- 6'2 A z-value of 
1.65 would be sufficient to reject, at the usual five per 
cent level, the statistical hypothesis that agreement with 
the incidental stimuli was no greater than would have oc-
curred by chance. 
The data were next examined with respect to two other 
questions: Was there a significant tendency to judge the 
mid-stimulus greater rather than smaller, and did either sex 
perform more accurately than the other? Each S's proportion 
of "hits" or agreements with the flashed word was transformed 
to ¢.:2 arcsin JP, a transformation which tends to normalize 
the distribution of proportions. 1 Table II lists the group 
means and standard deviations. 
TABLE II 
AGREEMENT WITH EACH OF TWO INCIDENTAL STIMULI 
FOR MALE AND FEMALE GROUPS JUDGING MID~STIMULUS 
IviEANS AND (STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
Incidental stimulus 
greater smaller 
1.828 
1.985 
( .360) 
( .488) 
1.596 
1.396 
{ .405) 
( .257) 
An analysis of variance is detailed in Appendix E. 
~. M. Walker and J. Lev, Statistical Inference, 1953, 
p. 423. 
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The results indicate that the response "greater" was indeed 
more frequently used: that is, a significant constant error 
(negative time error) existed (p <.01). Neither sex out-
performed the other at a significant level. 
Other stimuli: accuracy. For each S and for each of 
the four stimuli other than the equal-to-standard mid-
stimulus, four trials were to be considered: the last two 
in which the stimulus was accompanied by the flashed greater 
or smaller, and the last two in which it was accompanied by 
the control flash. Thus S might score two hits, one hit, or 
no hits (agreements with the flash) under each condition. 
TABLE III 
JUDGMENTS OF STIMULI LARGER AND SMALLER THAN STANDARD IN 
PRESENCE OF APPROPRIATE AND CONTROL INCIDENTAL STIMULI 
Stimulus Number of hits when incidental stimulus was 
Size Appropriate Control 
0 1 2 0 1 2 
No. 2** 0 8 24 2 15 15 
No. 4 3 14 15 3 12 17 
No. 8 4 17 11 2 16 14 
No. 11* 1 5 26 3 8 21 
- -Total 8 44 76 10 51 67 
*p < .05 **p < .01 
The distributions of these scores among the 32 Ss are 
shown in Table III. The control entries in these tables may 
be taken as expected frequencies. Then the departure from 
these values of the frequencies observed with meaningful 
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words may be measured by means of chi-square. (To avoid 
the use of very small frequencies, the columns for zero and 
one are combined.) For both Stimulus No. 2 and Stimulus No. 
11, the resulting values are sufficient to reject (at the 1 
per cent and 5 per cent levels respectively) the hypothesis 
that the number of hits was not increased by the word stimu-
lus (chi-square: 9.067 and 2.805). For the other two stim-
uli, the data run (weakly) in the reverse direction to that 
predicted; and over the entire table, the predicted effect 
is not significant. 
The question may be raised whether Ss who were appar-
ently affected by the incidental stimulus in their judgments 
of the mid-stimulus were also affected by it in judging the 
other stimuli. Figure 9 indicates that 13 Ss may be selected 
whose overall scores on the mid-stimulus were so great (15 
or more matches) that a chance distribution would include 
only two or three of their number. These will be referred 
to as the influenced group, and the other 19 as non-influenced. 
Table IV indicates the distributions of accuracy scores 
for the two groups. It will be seen that, for non-influenced 
Ss, the total scores were virtually identical, while influ-
enced Ss did obtain somewhat (not significantly) greater 
accuracy when the meaningful incidental stimulus was present. 
When the results for individual patch sizes are analyzed, 
the inuluenced Ss showed significantly greater accuracy on 
Stimuli Nos. 2 and 11; the non-influenced Ss showed signifi-
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TABLE IV 
JUDGMENTS OF STIMULI LARGER AND S~aLLER THAN STANDARD IN 
PRESENCE OF APPROPRIATE AND CONTROL INCIDENTAL STIMULI 
AMONG INFLUENCED AND NON-INFLUENCED SUBJECTS 
Thirteen "Influenced" Subjects 
Stimulus Number of hits when incidental stimulus was 
Size Appropriate Control 
0 1 2 0 1 2 
No. 2* 0 2 11 1 5 7 
No. 4 0 7 6 0 5 8 
No. 8 3 6 4 1 9 3 
No. 11* Q 1 12 1 3 9 
Total 3 16 33 3 22 27 
Nineteen "Non-Influenced" Subjects 
0 1 2 0 1 2 
-
No. 2* 0 6 13 0 11 8 
No. 4 3 7 9 3 7 9 
No. 8** 2 11 6 1 6 12 
No. 11 1 4 14 2 5 12 
Total 6 28 42 6 29 41 
*p <.05 **p < .01 (contrary to prediction) 
cantly increased accuracy on No. 2 and significantly de-
creased accuracy on No. 8. 
Mid-stimulus: latencz. It was desired to test predic-
tions concerning the latencies of judgment of Ss whose re-
sponding was influenced by the unnoticed incidental stimuli. 
Specifically, their speed of response when agreeing with the 
message of such stimulation was to be compared with the speed 
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of response when they disagreed with the message. 
Latencies had been measured in hundredths of a second; 
they ranged from about 80 to about 500. In order to normal-
ize the distribution of scores, each latency was transformed 
according to the commonly accepted logarithmic transforma-
tion.1 
The 32 Ss were again divided into an influenced group 
of 13 and a non-influenced group of 19. Predictions applied 
only to data from the former group; the latter is included 
for comparison. Each S's trials could be divided according 
to whether the incidental greater or smaller had been ex-
posed, and again according to whether the response was or 
was not in agreement with that word. For each S, the means 
of the resulting four sets of latencies were computed. 
Table V indicates the means and standard deviations of these 
subject means. 
An analysis of variance was carried out upon the data 
from the 13 influenced Ss. No evidence was found that judg-
ments agreeing with the incidental stimulus were made either 
more rapidly or more slowly than the opposite judgments. 
The analysis is summarized in Appendix F. 
1c. G. Mueller, Numerical transformations in the analysis of 
experimental data, Psychol. Bull., 46, 1949, 198-223. 
TABLE V 
MEAN LATENCIES OF JUDGING MID-STIMULUS IN AGREE~mNT OR 
DISAGREEMENT WITH TWO INCIDENTAL STIMULI AMONG 
INFLUENCED AND NON-INFLUENCED SUBJECTS 
MEANS AND (STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
Incidental Stimulus: 
greater smaller 
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Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
13 inf'luenced 2.279 2.332 2.324 2.284 
subjects ( .118) ( .138) ( .138) ( .111) 
19 non-influenced 2.270 2.359 2.373 2.307 
subjects ( .153) ( .158) ( .123) ( .148) 
Other Stimuli: latency. If similar tables were to be 
set up for each of the four other stimulus sizes, many Ss 
would fail to contribute data to one or more of the cells. 
Since the variability among subjects is great, it would be 
misleading to draw conclusion$ from such tables. 
Discussion 
Main hypothesis. Results served to support the psycho-
logical hypothesis: the choice of responses in a visual size 
comparison task was indeed affected by presentation of the 
response words as unnoticed incidental stimuli. 
Why did Experiment II show such an effect while Experi-
ment I failed to do so? In the discussion in Ohapter V a-
bove (pp. 56-59), four possible re&sons to account for that 
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failure were advanced. The f~rst was actual non-existence 
of the influence: being studi~d; results of the present ex-
periment allow that possibility to be rejected. 
The second was that the level of incidental stimulation 
needed to be raised for each S to a point as near as possible 
to his recognition level. T~is was accomplished in Experi-
ment II through raising the ~uration gradually to that point; 
responses to only the last 24 trials using the mid-stimulus 
were tallied. What if responses to still briefer flashes 
had been used? A check of the preceding set of 24 responses 
for each S indicates that th~re would have been no reason to 
reject the null hypothesis, either for all 32 Ss or for the 
13 who attained high scores on the last 24 trials. We may 
conclude that, where procedunes similar to the present are 
employed, incidental stimula~ion will exert an appropriate 
effect only when delivered at a physical level almost high 
enough for recognition. This underscores the observation 
made in a review of the field 
"that, in nearly all studies reporting relevant 
data, the reliability ot the Ss' judgments increases 
directly with the intem!li ty of the stimuli. ul 
The third possibility was that many Ss are, in a given 
situation, non-responsive to 1 stimulation without awareness. 
I 
That there is indeed a dichotomy in this respect is indicated 
1J. v. McConnell, R. L. Cutler, and E. B. McNeil, Subliminal 
stimulation: an overview, Aper. Psychologist, 13, 1958, p. 
231. 
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by the shape of the distribution of total scores (Figure 9, 
p. 74). About one third of S~ appear to be responsive. The 
existence of this dichotomy w~s not clearly supported by the 
data on responding to stimuli, other than the mid-stimulus. 
Nevertheless, present results do strengthen the assumption 
(referred to in Chapter V, p. 57) that there are many non-
responders. It is clearly unwise to depend on a small number 
of Ss for the kind of effects, sought, as in Experiment I. 
The fourth possibility ~d to do with the assumed extra 
variation in responding cause~ by the use of a totally dark 
field between presentations of patches. This situation was 
altered in Experiment II. Wtiether its alteration was a ne-
cessary condition for the predicted effect is not known. 
Other stimulus sizes. Were the flash stimuli effective 
in shifting judgments about the size of stimulus patches 
which were, in fact, greater ,or smaller than standard? Ex-
periment II was not designed to test this hypothesis effi-
ciently; most of the data we~e collected on judgments of the 
mid-stimulus. However, it was also possible to measure the 
degree to which judB~ents of each of four other stimulus 
patches benefited in accuracy from the incidental flash of 
the appropriate word (Table III). For the two extreme patch 
sizes, the easiest sizes to JUdge, there was significant in-
crease; for the two patch sizes closer to the standard and 
hence more difficult, there was no such increase. For the 
mid-stimulus itself, as noted above, there was significant 
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agreement with the incidental iflash. 
The results clearly fail ito demonstrate a consistent 
relation between the effect o~ incidental stimuli and the 
difficulty of judging the var\able stimulus patches. 
No obvious explanation p~esents itself. It is noted 
that the general level of acc~acy for Stimulus No. 8 was 
unpredictably low, reaching ~ outstandingly low level among 
the non-influenced Ss when th~ appropriate incidental stimu-
lus was flashed (Table IV). ~ow there were, no doubt, slight 
but c.onsistent differences am~ng the sounds made in inserting 
the different patch slides. ~s who depended in part on au-
ditory clues would run the risk of thereby depressing their 
scores; and there may conceiv~bly have been some obscure in-
teraction between such an effect and the flashing of the in-
cidental stimulus word. 
Latency. In Experiment II, latency of responding was 
studied in relation to Ss' a~eement with the message of the 
unnoticed incidental stimuli. It seems to be usually accep-
ted in psychophysics that 
"it takes longer ••• (on the average) to make a 
false judgment than it does to make a correct one."1 
But Henmon2 found that, .within a given category of 
1w. N. Kellogg, The time of judgment in psychometric measures, 
Amer. J. Psychol., 43, 1931, p. 74. 
2v. A. c. Henmon, The relati~n of the time of a judgment to 
its accuracy, Psychol. Rev., 18, 1911, 186-201. 
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subjective confidence, wrong judgments were made consistent-
ly more rapidly than right judgments. It appears that the 
chief variation of judgment time is its inverse variation 
with confidence of judgment, which in turn varies inversely 
with difficulty of the task. The co-variation of time of 
judgment with accuracy, other conditions remaining constant, 
is rather alight. 
Within the field of unnoticed incidental stimulation, 
1 Eagle measured three modes of response to a picture of a 
boy: trait list ratings, drawings of the boy, and latency 
of response. Unperceived flash stimuli showed the boy in 
aggressive or benevolent action. When the flash was of ag-
gressive action, the ratings and drawings indicated more 
negative and aggressive qualities in the picture than when 
the flash was of benevolent action. Also, the latency of 
response to the picture was greater under the aggressive 
condition. This last effect was not observed at a atatis-
tically significant level. However, when Ss were ordered 
according to the magnitude of this effect, the ranks were 
found to be significantly related to the corresponding ranks 
on the other two measures. Thus Sa whose ratings and draw-
ings seemed to be influenced by the presence of an unnoticed 
aggressively toned flash were also slow to respond. 
1 
M. Eagle, Effects of subliminal stimulation of aggressive 
content upon conscious cognition, J. Pers., 27, 1959,,578-
600. 
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Other findingsl are partly congruent with these. Re-
sponses which by their nature were appropriate to the 
flashed word ANGRY were delayed when compared with respnn-
ses inappropriate to that word. In both of these cases, 
by the very design of the experiments, the affective element 
is central. The more Ss responded to the unnoticed aggres-
sive content, the greater was the latency of responding. 
From these experiments it can be assumed that the un-
noticed presentation of material related to aggressive (or 
perhaps generally disturbing) affect, when it is registered 
by S and affects his responding, will make for an increase 
in latency. It may be, however, that the affective element 
is not crucial. Perhaps latency is always increased when 
an incidentally presented message of any kind is registered 
and responding is appropriately affected. 
On the other hand, one can reason in this fashion: 
If S is indeed being influenced by incidental messages, he 
should become more confident of judgments which agree with 
those messages and less confident of judgments which dis-
agree with them. Then according to the general conclusion 
above, drawn from psychophysical studies, he should respond 
more rapidly when in agreement with the flashed stimulation 
and more slowly when disagreeing with it. 
1 G. J. W. Smith, D.P. Spence, and G. S. Klein, Subliminal 
effects of verbal stimuli, J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol., 59, 
1959, 16'7-1'76. 
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Thus, opposite predictions can be made. If latencies 
of judgments which apparently are affected by the incidental 
stimulation are shorter than those of judgments not so af-
fected, it will seem most appropriate to think of the inci-
dental stimulation as additional information which can make 
S more confident of a judgment. If the reverse is true, it 
will appear likely that incidental registrations generally 
are associated with delays in responding. 
As reported above (p. 79 ), neither of the two opposite 
predicted relationships appeared in the latency data. What 
did appear was a greater latency for the response "smaller,n 
which was also made less often than the response "greater." 
This relationship may be traced in Table V as well as in 
Appendix F, where the analysis of variance is reported. 
A further comment is in order on the latency effects 
reported respectively by Smith, Spence, and Klein1 and Eagle2 
and referred to above. In the first of these reports, what 
was observed was a delay in producing a given type of re-
sponse--generally speaking, an unpleasant or negative re-
sponse. It was observed at a significant level when the un-
noticed stimulus was ANGRY, but was not observed when the 
latter was HAPPY. But such responses were given infrequently 
by these Ss (hospitalized neurotics) and hence were compar-
able to the response "smaller" in the present experiment. 
1o+<. cit. 20p. 't 
- c~ • 
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As the authors say, "our Ss gave negative responses only 
with perceptible reluctance."1 Such reluctance, it appears, 
may suffice to account for any generally reliable latency 
effects in this type of experiment. In general, the same 
considerations apply to Eagle's observations. 
Summary 
Sixteen male and 16 female Ss took part in a modified 
size comparison procedure, using the method of constant sti-
mulus differences. Rectangular patches of a checkerboard 
pattern were presented in a tachistoscope, first one of 
standard size followed by one of variable size, the latter 
to be judged "greater" or "smaller." In reality, 3/5 of the 
variable patches were identical to the standard. 
Immediately before the appearance of the variable patch, 
an incidental stimulus was flashed, consisting of the word 
greater, the word smaller, or a nonsense figure. The dura-
tion of this flash was increased until S reported seeing it, 
or until the duration of 100 milliseconds was reached. Re-
sponses to the last 24 presentations of the patch equal in 
size to the standard were then analyzed for agreement with 
the incidental greater or smaller. Responses to the last 
four presentations of each of the other four stimuli were 
analyzed for the effect of the appropriate one of these words 
as compared with a nonsense flash. 
1 P• 173. 
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Over all Ss, for the stimulus equal in size to the 
standard, the frequency of agreement with the incidental 
word was so great as to permit rejection of the hypothesis 
that such a word causes no difference in responses. There 
was also a marked tendency for Ss to report this patch as 
greater than the standard. Thirteen of the 32 Ss achieved 
a high degree of agreement with the incidental word, while 
the agreement scores of the other 19 were distributed in a 
chance fashion. Sex of Ss was not related to the agreement 
. 
scores. 
For the four patches which were greater or smaller than 
the standard, it was not demonstrated that the accuracy of 
responses had been increased by the presence of the inciden-
tal word naming the correct response. This was true for all 
32 Ss, and also for the 13 whose scores on the mid-stimulus 
were highest. Accuracy on certain of the individual stimuli, 
however, did appear to be related to the incidental stimula-
tion. 
Latency data from the 13 high-scoring Ss, in judgments 
of the patch equal to standard, did not show any relation-
ship to the agreement of S's judgment with the incidental 
word. 
Some considerations with regard to these results have 
been advanced. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The major aim of the present research was to test whe-
ther, within the setting of a psychophysical task, stimuli 
that do not result in conscious percepts may produce an 
immediate effect upon perceptual judgments. The novelty of 
this aim appears in the choice of experimental situations 
' with the combined restrictions which were d&scribed in the 
last section of Chapter II above. It was noted that these 
restrictions imply certain assumptions about the range of 
experimental situations within which the kind of effect 
sought may occur. 
It was assumed that an unnoticed, incidentally supplied 
cue can affect effortful, attended behavior as well as unat-
tended, relaxed behavior. It was assumed that the effects 
of such stimulation can be observed even when S's range of 
possible responses in the attended task is quite.' narrow, and 
when he must respond almost at once. It was assumed that 
the incidentally supplied cue might be of a novel class, 
different from the stimulus material of the attended task; 
and that it might directly present the goal response. It 
was assumed, finally, that the stimuli in 
be systematically affect-related. 
use need not 
Two experiments were performed, testing the effect of 
an unnoticed (flashed) stimulus word--greater or smaller--
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on judgments of the size of a rectangular patch. In the 
second of these, perceptual judgments (near the point of 
subjective equality) were indeed found to be affected in the 
predicted manner. 
The Assumptions Reviewed 
In making some of the ass~ptions required for the 
present experiments, positions were taken which were partly 
at odds with those of other investigators. 
One assumption which was proven incorrect was that 
nearly all Ss would show behavioral effects due to the pre-
sence of unnoticed incidental stimuli. The results at hand 
clearly add to the evidence that many Ss are non-responders 
under the conditions of laboratory experiment.s. Eagle1 has 
begun to -isolate the personality correlates of individual 
responsiveness. However, no study is known dealing primarily 
' 
with the constancy of responsiveness as the individual is 
tested on various procedures involving unnoticed stimuli. 
Research on this point is clearly in order. 
In their experimental designs, some experimenters have 
allowed for great differences among Ss in the physical level 
at which effects of unnoticed stimuli may appear. Many have 
not. The present findings testify to the desirability of 
making such an allowance. In some cases where results have 
1M. Eagle, Some personality correlates of responsiveness to 
unperceived cues (paper presented at A.P.A. convention, 
1959; abstract, Amer. Psychologist, 14, 1959, 359). 
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been null or equivocal, it seems likely that a redesigned 
experiment taking this factor into account would yeiid more 
intelligible results. 
Klein was quoted above (pp. 20, 22) as expecting the 
effects of incidental stimuli only or chiefly where S is not 
required to represent reality accurately. This study has 
proceeded on the contrary assumption that such effects may 
be obtained where S is required to represent reality accur-
ately. The results obtained do not by any means serve to 
deny the crucial role which Klein1 assigns to the state of 
consciousness in determining the structures of registrations 
and perceptions. They do, however, present an opportunity 
for investigation of the range of induced attitudes relative 
to the task, within which the behavior of Ss may be influ-
enced through unnoticed stimuli. Thus, E's instructions to 
S might be varied systematically. At one end of the scale, 
great stress would be laid on attaining maximum accuracy; 
at the other, S would be encouraged to let himself be influ-
enced by "hunches" or to make sheer guesses. 
It may also be possible to investigate the question of 
dictating versus hinting the response to an attended task 
through unreportable stimulation. The difference was illus-
trated in Chapter II above (p. 24), as it might have applied 
1G. S. Klein, Consciousness in psychoanalytic theory: some 
implications for current research in perception, J. Amer. 
Psychoanal. Ass., 7, 1959, 5-34. 
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to Kolers' experiment. 1 Had Kolers flashed before his Ss, 
not a hint to guide their performance of the task but an 
arbitrary designation of the desired response, he would have 
been using response dictation. Presumably he would have 
been by-passing the judgment process. 
In the present experiment, the unreportable flash did 
indeed consist of a printed form of the response to be spoken. 
The task was so simple, however, that the same word--greater 
or smaller--may have operated as a suggestion also. It may 
have slanted or guided the judgment process, rather than cir-
cumventing that process. Moreover, the flash did not at any 
time make a suggestion contrary to reality. If such a sug-
gestion were made and were systematically accepted by S, it 
would seem more likely that the judgment process is by-passed. 
The results at least suggest that response dictation 
may be effective with some Ss. A modification of Kolers' 
experiment along the lines suggested above would be one pos-
sible experimental approach to the question. 2 
Klein has asked3 whether the process aroused by incidental 
1P. A. Kolers, Subliminal stimulation in problem-solving, 
Ailler. J. Psychol., 70, 1957, 437-441. 
2 A recently published report deals with an atteL:pt to induce 
erroneous solutions through a procedure similar to Kolers'. 
The method was unsatisfactory, however, and results are 
equivocal at best. (E.O. Gerard, Subliminal stimulation in 
problem-solving, Amer. J. Psychol., 73, 1960, 121-12~) 
3G. S Klein, On subliminal activation, J. NeN rv1ent. Dis., 
128, ·1959, p. 296. Original author's emphasis. 
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stimulation "has an independent status in the sense that its 
cognitive effects run parallel to, without intruding upon, a 
concurrent act of discrimination." The answer appears to be 
that those effects may gehave in this fashion, as in Klein's 
own experiments and others; on the other hand, they may af-
fect concurrent acts of discrimination, as in the present 
study. 
A View of the Process 
In the review of the literature in Chapter II above, 
there was derived from the subjective-introspective studies 
the concept of a kind of process preceding perception which 
is not subject either to the rules of logic or to the normal 
control of the will; which may sometimes enter consciousness 
only through its effects upon another percept; and which may 
be associated with marked affective tone. From the objective-
behaviorist studies it appeared that this kind of process, 
when generated by stimulation of which S is unaware, may 
exert an effect upon a separate objective perceptual task. 
In the present writer'~ view, this area of behavior can 
be profitably explored using a framework of concepts drawn 
from psychoanalytic theory. 
We use without conscious attention, and sometimes with-
out any awareness of the process, multitudinous slight cues 
in the course of such automatized activities as driving a 
car. Moreover, very slight unnoticed cues sometimes serve 
as signals to draw our attention to a previously unattended 
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phenomenon. This is, at one level, unconscious integration: 
i.e., the integration of unnoticed cues into the ongoing 
purposeful activities. 
The present study is concerned with the class of situa-
tion in which S is performing some purposeful activity with 
attention, with conscious effort, and with emphasis on the 
accuracy of perception. Can it be expected that unnoticed 
cues will be integrated into the performance of this sort of 
activity? 
That such integration does not ordinarily occur is thought 
to be the result of critical, logical, inhibiting processes. 
In psychoanalytic terms, these are processes of censorship 
based on the experience of reality and performed by the ego. 
These censoring or disintegrative processes must, to a great 
extent, take place without conscious attention. The question 
why integration without awareness occurs under some circum-
stances becomes the question why the unconscious censoring 
processes are not fully effective in those circumstances. 
Luborsky and Shevrin, in a study1 of the Petzl experi-
ment (which they replicated), present a useful line of think-
ing. All perception, they assume, is ihitially physiognomic: 
that is, the individual perceives the object in terms of its 
personal meaning for him, in terms of its satisfaction of 
his needs and wishes. nrnitially" means here, first, that 
1L. Luborsky and H. Shevrin, Dreams and day-residues: a study 
of the Foetzl observation, Bull. Menninger Olin., 20, 1956, 
135-148. 
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this is characteristic of infantile perception and, second, 
that it remains characteristic of the brief process preceding 
perception. In maturity we have adaptive modes or defenses 
which divest the perceptual world of most of its physiognomic 
impact, so far as we can be consciously aware of it. But it 
may be assumed that the personal meaning remains, more or 
less unavailable to conscious awareness because of repression. 
The experiment of these authors involved tachistoscopic 
presentation of a rather complex picture. In the physiognomic 
pt>a.perceptual stage, some parts of the picture would become 
associated with perceptual categories1 which would ordinarily 
be excluded from awareness, either because they are conflic-
tual or because they are irrelevant to the present purpose. 
If sufficient time were available, S's defense or censorship 
process would function as it normally does in perception. 
He would arrive at an adapted percept which is appropriate 
in terms of reality and which is only slightly or not at all 
influenced by the associated categories of the pre-perceptual 
stage. 
With insufficient time, however, or under other unfavor-
able conditions, adaptation is incomplete. To put the matter 
in a somewhat different way: 
1 
"The subliminal stimulus exercises a selective func-
tion upon responses hitherto associated with the 
stimulus material, the occurrence probabilities of 
J. S. Bruner, On perceptual readiness, Psychol. Rev., 64 
1957, 123-152. 
associations being determined by emotional as op-
posed to logical factors; that is, the subliminal 
stimulus activates primary thought processes."l 
96 
It is noteworthy that onl1 in its stress on emotional 
factors does this concept differ in essence from one pro-
pounded 66 years earlier: 
"Zwischen !usserer Reizung and bewusster Erregung 
liegt eine Zwischenstufe, in welcher nicht bewusst 
der Komplex disponibler Associationen erregt wer-
den kann, und in welcher diese associativen .i.v~iter­
regungen je nach ihren Beziehungen zu den gegen-
w!rtigen Bewusstseinsinhalt verst!rkend oder schw!-
chend, beschleunigend oder verzBgend auf die umset-
zung des Reizes in bewusste Erregung einwirken 
kBnnen. n2 · 
The dynamic aspect. In the set of propositions in 
Chapter III, it was stated that the mature S minimizes re-
sponses based on stimulus information which he considers not 
in accord with reality. Hence, if he is unaware of the ex-
istence of such information, he is more likely to be influ-
enced by it. The suggestion is that incidental stimuli, for 
example, 
"because they did not reach awareness ••• were 
relatively effective in influencing reactions to 
1N. F. Dixon, The effect of subliminal stimulation upon auto-
nomic and verbal behaviour, J. Ahn. Soc. Fsychol., 57, 1958, 
p. 35; original author's emphasis. 
2
"Between external stimulation and conscious excitatioL lies 
an intermediate stage, in which the complex of available 
associations can be excited without awareness, and in which 
these associative co-excitations can, according bo their 
relation with the present content of consciousness, influ-
ence the conversion of the stimulus into conscious excita-
tion by strengthening or weakening, by accelerating or de-
laying.tt H. Nltlnsterberg, Beitr!ge zur experimentellen Psy-
chologie, Heft 4, 1892, pp. lO-ll. 
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the face." 1 
It appears now that this view omitted one essential: 
the dynamic aspect, or the motivation for accepting the in-
fluence. It is to variations in this factor that we may most 
reasonably ascribe differences in the effects being studied. 
The quotation might better read: Among the conditions for 
incidental stimuli to influence reactions were these: (1) 
they must not reach awareness; (2) they must somehow enlist 
adequate dynamic (motivational) forces. 
In Chapter II above (pp. 18-20), consideration was given 
to the attitude or state of consciousness of S. In effortful 
attended tasks, would S's "need to represent reality effec-
tively and accurately in his responses" 2 prevent him from 
using or from being influenced by unnoticed incidental stim-
ulation? Earlier studies in which such a need had been in-
duced had appeared to demonstrate this kind of influence. 
It was assumed that effortful attended behavior could indeed 
be influenced. The motivation for accepting such influence, 
however, was not analyzed. 
Here it will be prudent to note Rapaport's comment3 that 
1 G. J. W. Smith, D. P. Spence, and G. o. Klein, Subiliiminal 
effects of verbal stimuli, J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 59, 1959, 
p. 175; original authors' emphasis. 
2F. H. Goldberg, H. Fiss, and G. s. Klein, Effects of an un-
discriminated stimulus on imagery, p. 3 (paper presented at 
A.P.A. convention, 1959; abstract, Amer. Psychologist, 14, 
1959, 359). 
3n. Rapaport, Toward a theory of thir~ing, p. 702. In D. 
Rapaport, Ed.: Organization and Pathology of Thought, 1951. 
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the cathectic dynamics of the variants of conscious experi-
ence in reality-testing and judgment remain unexplored. 
Nevertheless, one may offer as speculation a hypothetical 
view of the perceptual process based on the outline of Lu-
borsky and Shevrin1 and on the general view of Fisher. 2 
The concept was sketched above of a pre-perceptual pro-
cess which, for lack of time, cannot proceed to its normal 
conclusion in the production of a finished percept. Acting 
through primary-process relations, the pre-percept will have 
activated a number of perceptual categories. Some of these 
would ordinarily be excluded from awareness, either because 
they are conflictual or because they are irrelevant to the 
present purpose. For this reason, the half-formed percept 
is likely to undergo repression. 
At this point, personality differences among individuals 
and fluctuations in mode of response in a single individual 
become paramount. One S may absolutely, in every case, deny 
access to consciousness to any ideas or unfinished percepts 
which are conflict-related. Another may be relatively free 
in this respect and may adkit almost any ideas or perceptual 
stages. A third may vary markedly from day to day in this 
respect. 
1cro. cit. 
2c. Fisher, Studies on the nature of suggestion: Part II. 
The transference meaning of giving suggestions, J. Amer. 
Psychoanal. Ass., 1, 1953, 406-437. 
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Now if unfinished percepts are allowed to influence 
consciousness, they may be expected to have the characteris-
tics noted by investigators of the subjective-introspective 
group. Being primitively physiognomic, they are not subject 
to the rules of logic. Being associated with primitive needs 
and wishes, they carry marked affective tone; 1 on the· other 
hand, this tone may be repressed while the non-affective in-
fluences upon consciousness are admitted. They are lliOSt 
likely to have an observable effect by altering or influen-
cing another percept. Also, their efiects seem exempt from 
normal voluntary control. 
These characteristics have, indeed, been found by the 
series of investigators that includes Urbantschitsch, 2 Allers 
and Teler,3 and Fisher. 4 Apparent relationships have been 
pointed out5 between the kinds of percepts which an individ-
ual can report only indirectly, without awareLess of their 
1An unpleasant affect has been reported as attached to the 
recovery of material in a P6tzl-type procedure. (H. Shevrin 
and L. Luborsky, The measurement of preconscious perception 
in dreams and ima:1;es: an investigation of the Poetzle phe-
nomenon, J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 56, 1958, 285-294). 
2v. Urbantschitsch, Uber unbewusste Gesichtseindrftcke and 
deren Auftreten in subjectiven optischen Anschauun 5 sbilde, 
z. ges. Neurol. Psychiat., 41, 1918, 170-184. 
3R. Allers and J. Teler, Uber die Verwertung unbemerkter 
Eindrficke bei Assoziationen, Z. ges. Neurol. Psychiat., 89, 
1924, 492-513. 
4c. Fisher, Dreams, images, and perception: a study of un-
conscious-preconscious relationships, J ... Amer. Psychoanal. 
Assn., 4, 1956, 5-48. 
5Ibid. 
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source, and the central neurotic problems of that individual. 
Fisher comiDents that 
"primitive phases of the operation of the ego ap-
paratuses of perception and memory can be thought 
of as permitting the freer discharge of drive en-
ergies and (as) entering into drive-organized image 
and dream formation."l 
Thus the motivation for accepting unnoticed incidental stim-
ulation may be thought to be relat~ to drives which are 
central to the personality. 
The percepts discussed by these experimenters, however, 
either were rather complex (parts of a picture or photograph) 
or were measured in such a fashion as to allow for the intro-
duction of complexity (checklist of elements in the descrip-
tion of a Rubin double profile). In the presently reported 
experiment, the percepts and the perceptual task were simple; 
the response was a sihgle binary choice; and the unnoticed 
incidental stimuli were common words, thought to be not sys-
tematically affect-related. In what fashion might drive 
energies be discharged through acceptance of the suggestions 
made by such stimuli? 
For a highly tentative answer, one may turn to psycho-
analytic interpretations of suggestibility and of the highly 
suggestible condition of hypnosis. Suggestibility is an as-
pe~t of regression. Fisher2 sums up Freud's3 and his own 
1Ibid., p. 42. 
~. Fisher, Studies on the nature of suggestion, Part II, ~· 
cit. 
3R. White, G. Fox, and w. Harris, Hypnotic hypermnesia for 
recently learned material, J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 35, 1940, 
88-104. 
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concept of suggestibility as involving a regression of libido 
to a more infantile stage, changes in the ego and ego-ideal 
resulting in a giving up of the reality-testing function, 
and a regression from object-relations to identification. 
Now a well-known concomitant of hypnotic states is the 
phenomenon of hypermnesia, or ability to recall material 
that is normally unavailable. This has been credited1 ' 2 to 
the regression induced. S is secure in his transference 
relation to the ,hypnotist; he feels neither anxiety nor the 
need to protect himself. 
These considerations may well apply to the susceptibil-
ity to unnoticed incidental stimulation, whether complex or 
simple pre-percepts are involved. As with hypnosis, some Ss 
are susceptible and some are not. Those who are undergo 
(unconsciously) a temporary regression, in which there is a 
loosening of both reality-testing and defensive functions 
while they identify (unconsciously) with the experimenter. 
As in hypnosis, the motivational force involved is seen as 
an infantile wish for love, transformed into an identifica-
tion. As in hypermnesia, S ceases for the time being to 
maintain his critical, defensive dissociation of certain 
ideas; he permits them to be combined in either an integrative 
1R. White, G. Fox, and W. Harris, Hypnotic hypermnesia for 
recently learned material, J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 35, 1940, 
88-104. 
2B. G. Rosenthal, Hypnotic recall of material learned under 
anxiety and non-anxiety producing conditions, J. Exp. Psy-
cho!., 34, 1944, 369-389. 
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or a syncretic fashion. 
The regression is, of course, a partial and temporary 
one, probably to be regarded as a regression in the service 
of the ego: that is, a regression likely to result in a bet-
ter integration of diverse elements of personality and in 
more efficient functioning. 1 One notes also Bartemeier's 
remark2 that these phenomena implying brief, ego-syntonic 
regression occur in everyday life and belong to the psycho-
pathology of daily existence. Even the "controlled states 
of consciousness 11 which we are warned3 to expect in the lab-
oratory are not, after all, fully successful in excluding 
them. But these regressive processes need have nothing of 
the patho~ogical about them. The evidence suggests, indeed, 
that it is the healthier Ss who can make use of them. 4 '5' 6 
1E. Kris, On preconscious mental processes (in D. Rapaport, 
Ed., Organization and Patholosy of Thought, 1951), 474-493. 
2L. H. Bartemeier, Discussion (of 1\ii. Brenman, M. 1i1. Gill, and 
F. J •. Hacker, Alterations in the state of the ego in hypno-
sis, Bull. Menninger Olin., 11, 1947), p. 66. 
3G. s. Klein, Consciousness in psychoanalytic theory, op. cit. 
4s. Bach and G. s. Klein·, Conscious effects of prolonged sub-
liminal exposures of words (paper presented at A.P.A. con-
vention, 1957; abstract, Amer. Psychologist, 1957, 12, 397). 
5M. Eagle, op. cit. 
6s. M. Friedman and c. Fisher, Further observations on pri-
mary modes of perception: the use of a masking technique 
for subliminal visual stimulation, J. Amer. Psychoa~al. 
~., 8, 1960, 100-129. 
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Possible further research. The view just stated brings 
into the foreground questions not only of the personality of 
subjects but of rapport in the experimental situation. Ex-
perimenters have chiefly manipulated the visual (or aural) 
presentations to s. A few have noted that comfortable rap-
port between S and E seems to be a necessary condition for 
the kind of response sought. But it appears that further 
investigation of this dimension might well prove productive. 
Ss who respond to unreportable stimuli in one situation 
. 
may, quite possibly, fail to respond in an identical proce-
dure with a different experimenter. Some Ss who fail to re-
spond as expected may be exercising an unconscious negativ-
ism, like patients who disobey a psychotherapist's instruc-
tions to dream. 1 Again, it may be that, if the experimental 
procedure were fully mechanized, leaving S with a minimum of 
direct human contact, he would no longer respond to unreport-
able stimuli. ·(This does not follow unquestionably from the 
foregoing discussion. A man-machine contact is still a hu-
man contact on the side of the man, and the very strangeness 
of it might accentuate transference elements.) 
A final ambitious suggestion would be for a broadly 
organized program which would undertake to investigate the 
effects of unnoticed incidental stimulation in terms of (1) 
1c. Fisher, Studies on the nature of suggestion, Part I. 
Experimental induction of dreams by direct suggestion, J. 
Amer. Psychoanal. Ass., 1, 1953, 222-255. 
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characteristics of the experimental material; (2) experi-
menter-subject relationship; (3) states of induced regres-
sion; (4) characteristic degrees of suggestibility in S; 
(5) other personality factors. Such a program seems to 
hold the best promise for shaping our theoretical conceptions 
of responding to unnoticed stimulation. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY 
This study is concerned with the effect upon effortful 
judgment behavior of unnoticed, unreportable stimulation of 
such a nature as to specify one of the possible responses 
to the judgment task. 
Subjective-introspective studies have reported a sort 
of pre-sensational process in perception, which sometimes 
leads to illogical associations; which may enter conscious-
ness only through its effect upon another percept; and wl1ich 
may be associated with marked affective tone. Objective-
behaviorist studies employing incidental stimulation in un-
reportable fashion have demonstrated its effects in a pseudo-
ESP task; on illusions; on judgments of the characteristics 
of faces; and in rather complex perceptual-cognitive tasks. 
Studies from the psychoanalytic school have demonstrated the 
pathways of symbolic relationship through which similar ef-
fects can apparently proceed. 
In the present design, Ss were to pay effortful atten-
tion to a task of visual discrimination, while unaware that 
they were being exposed to stimulation with a meaning related 
to that task. Their responses were to be immediate and con-
strained to a small number of alternatives. The incidental 
stimulation was to present one of the possible task responses 
directly, rather than by way of suggestion. Tasks or stimuli 
with known affective connotations were to be avoided. 
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The first hypothesis was this: In a standard psycho-
physical ta·.sk, designed according to the method of constant 
stimulus differences, forced discriminations can be influ-
enced by the presence of an unnoticed incidental cue which 
~irectly suggests the response to be evoked. 
A second hypothesis was this: The more closely re-
lated is the incidental cue to the response it evokes, the 
greater will be its effect. 
As a discrimination task the visual comparison of 
sizes of stimulus patches was selected. Incidental stimu-
lation was by means of a brief flash immediately preceding 
the variable stimulus to be judged. The flash consisted of 
a printed form of the words to be spoken as response: great-
·~ or smaller. As an incidental stimulus less closely re-
lated to the response, the misspelled forms graeter and 
samller were employed. Instructions were such as to induce 
the set appropriate to a well-defined laboratory discrim-
ination task, together with openness to any related but 
different stimulation which might appear. 
In Experiment I, three Ss judged the sizes of 11 stimu-
lus patches over a total of 1,152 to 1,563 trials each. The 
appearance of each variab:;l.e patch was immediately preceded 
by a brief unnoticed flash bearing one of the words greater, 
smaller, graeter, samller, or a nonsense stimulus. The same 
unnoticed stimulus was used for three consecutive trials. 
Between stimulations, the visual field was totally dark. 
1G7 
With the orders of stimuli fully counterbalanced, there 
was no demonst~able tendency for flashes of greater or !!!1-
ler or misspelled versions of them to evoke from S the cor-
responding judgments. Failure to obtain the predicted ef-
fect was tentatively ascribed to the experimental conditions 
and to the small number of Ss employed. 
In Experiment II, 32 Ss judged the sizes of five stim-
ulus patches over 44 to 337 trials each. The appearance of 
each variable patch was immediately preceded by a brief un-
noticed flash bearing one of the words greater or smaller, 
or a nonsense stimulus. The dUration of this flash was 
increased until S reporbed seeing it, or until the duration 
of 100 milliseconds was reached. 
Of every 40 variable patches presented, 24 were equal 
in size to the standard. The last 24 presentations of this 
equal-size patch were then analyzed for agreement with the 
incidental greater or stnaller. The last four presentations 
of each of the other four patches were then analyzed for 
the effect of the appropriate one of these words compared 
with the nonsense figure. 
Over all Ss, for the patch equal in size to the stand-
ard, the frequency of agreement w1 th the incidental vo rd 
~-:..~ ... L ·. 
was so great as to permit rejection of the hypothesis that 
such a word causes no difference in responses. Of the 32 
100 
Ss, 13 achieved a bigh degree of agreement with the inciden-
tal word, while the agreement scores of the other 19 were 
distributed in a chance fashion. Agreement was not signifi-
cantly influenced by sex of S. 
For the four patches which were greater or smaller than 
the standard, it was not demonstrated that the accuracy of 
responding had been increased by the presence of the inci-
dental word naming the correct response. The magn~tude of 
the main effect, it was noted, was not great enough to allow 
of any lesser or attenuated effects being detected as such. 
The effect of incidental words on responding to patches 
greater or smaller than standard is thought of as being at-
tenuated by the genuine relationship of patch size. 
The minor hypothesis was not tested in Experiment II. 
It, too, predicted an attenuated effect; hence it could not 
have been supported at a significant level. 
Latency data from ·the 13 high-scoring Ss, in judgments 
of the patch equal to standard, did not show any relation 
to the agreement of the judgments with the incidental word. 
It appe~s from the main result that attended judgments 
of objective matters are c~mong some individuals) subject to 
influence from unreportable stimulation which supplies or 
dictates the response. 
In the normal course of behavior, slight cues are often 
used without full or even partial awareness. The information 
which they convey is received, used to signal a modification 
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of ongoing behavior, and apparently discarded. But where 
the behavior involves a closely attended task and where the 
nature of the slight cue is such as to bypass the normal 
process of this task, we ordinarily assume that conscious 
awareness and a critical attitude will be directed to the 
cues before they are allowed to influence the responding. 
The behavior of sensitive Ss in this experiment is seen 
as a failure to bring into play the critical attitude or 
censorship to which perceptions of this kind are normally 
subject. As in hypnosis and the minor hypnagogic states, 
there is a temporary suggestibility. This is tentatively 
regarded as a manifestation of ego-syntonic regression: re-
ality-testing is not fully performed, for the moment, and 
the individual, in infantile fashion, accepts and repeats 
what is told him. Several possibilities tor further exami-
nation of such phenomena appear from this examination. 
APPENDIX A 
EXPERIMENT I 
SAMPLE ORDER OF STIMULUS PRESENTATIONS 
Flashed incidental word; number re-
presenting size or stimulus patch. 
1. greater-7 2. greater-6 3. greater-10 
4. nonsense-5 5. nonsense-6 6. nonsense-3 
7. graeter-11 8. graeter-9 9. graeter-8 
10. nonsense-4 11. nonsense-! 12. nonsense-2 
13. smaller-5 :14 • smaller-1 15. smaller-6 
16. nonsense-8 17. nonsense-7 18. nonsense-9 
19. samller-4 20. samller-3 21. samller-2 
22. nonsense-10 23. nonsense-6 24. nonsense-11 
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Stimuli 
Patch No./Incid. 
1 smaller 
2 smaller 
3 smaller 
4 smaller 
5 smaller 
6 smaller 
6 greater 
7 greater 
8 greater 
9 greater 
10 greater 
11 greater 
Total Right 
Total Trials 
APPENDIX B 
EXPERIMENT I 
FRE~UENCY OF CORRECT JUDGMENTS 
Second Subject Third Subject 
( 64 trials each) ( 48 trials each) 
E:xper. Control E:xper. Control 
58 61 29 26 
54 53 27 31 
52 49 16 26 
45 49 20 25 
45 46 15 19 
40 36 18 11 
26 26 30 26 
31 30 33 25 
34 40 40 42 
40 46 36 33 
49 49 41 35 
47 48 36 40 
521 533 341 339 
768 768 576 576 
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Fourth Subjeet 
(64 trials each) 
Exper. Control 
63 57 
59 60 
46 46 
42 46 
40 31 
26 23 
34 34 
38 44 
50 49 
55 50 
58 50 
60 58 
571 548 
768 768 
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APPENDIX C 
EXPERIMENT I -- ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
Each of three Sa had made a number of judgments--
"greater" or "sma1ler"--on the appearance of each of the 
possible combinations of incidental flash and stimulus 
patch. The responses could be designated as accurate or 
inaccurate, according to whether they agreed with the mean-
ing of the flashed word or, when the control flash had been 
used, of the word for which the control flash had been sub-
stituted. The analysis was to determine whether judgments 
of the stimulus patches of sizes #5, #6, and #7 were sig-
nificantly more accurate when the flash consisted of the 
word (correctly or incorrectly spelled) then when it con-
sisted of the control (nonsense) shape. 
The percentage of accurate judgments for each S under 
each condition was transformed to p = 2 arcsin [P, a trans-
TABLE C-1. MEAN ACCURA.CY AT MID-RA.NGE 
Flash Stimulus: smaller or samller greater or graeter 
Patch Size: 5 6 6 7 
Experimental 
rl Mean 1.666 1. 517 1.618 1.748 
s. d. .427 .277 .222 .215 
Control p Mean 1.635 1.326 1. 557 1.694 
s. d. .350 .346 .145 .236 
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TABLE C-2' 
ACCUJU.CY AT MID-RANGE: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
Source 
TOTAL 
(a) Experimental effect 
(b) Stimulus patch size 
(c) Exper'l x patch size 
(d) Subjects 
(e) Ss x Exper'l effect 
(f) Ss x Patch size 
(g) Ss x Exper'l x size 
Sum of 
Squares 
1.7081 
.0425 
.2946 
.0237 
.1418 
.0241 
1.0414 
.1400 
D. f. 
23-
1 
3 
3 
2 
2 
6 
6 
*p(.05; error term is (e) pooled with (g). 
**p < .05; error term is (g). 
Mean 
Square 
.0425 
F 
.0982 4.79* 
.0079 
.0709 
.0121 
.1736 7 .4SSI* 
.0233 
f~mation which tends to normalize data representing pro-
portions (Walker and Lev, 1953, p. 423). 
Table C-2 indicates the results of an analysis of 
variance performed on these scores. Although all of the 
mean differences are in the predicted direction, the main 
prediction is not supported at a significant level. 
The only effects which are of statistically signifi-
cant magnitude are those associated with patch size (stimu-
lus number) and with the interaction of this dimension and 
individual Sa. That is, responses to the four different 
stimulus patch conditions varied according to the patch 
being judged and also from S to S. It shoubB be noted 
that the difference between 6-smaller and 6-greater, 
apart from the flash stimulus, was a matter of their 
sequential relationships to other patch sizes. The 
significant effects are interpreted to mean that Ss 
respond "greater" more consistently as patch a ze in-
creases; that this tendency is complicated by a nega-
tive recency effect; and that both accuracy and recency 
effect vary from one S to another. 
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APPENDIX D 
EXPERIMENT II 
TABLE OF DATA 
s Age Sex Milliseconds Frequency of Agreement Prelim. Start Recog. greater smaller Total 
1 24 m 65 30 60 7 9 16 
2 24 m 40 22 72 6 4 10 
3 20 m 49 26 57 4 7 11 
4 20 m 40 24 100/1 10 2 12 
5 17 f 55 24 32 8 6 ]4 
6 19 m 46 25 47 5 7 12 
7 31 m 68 35: 45 10 5 15 
8 2~ m 72. 36 37 7 4 11 
9 17 f 84 50 59 7 6 13 
10 24 m 28 22. 32. 6 3 9 
11 23 m 36 25 60 10 5 l5 
12 24 m 50 29 81 9 10 19 
13 18 m 27 25 100# 9 8 17 
14 17 m 30 24 44 6 6 12 
15 22 f 40 25 100/1 12 4 16 
16 21 f 68 37 47 10 3 13 
17 20 f 41 26 42 8 7 15 
18 20 m 69 39 43 9 6 15 
19 20 f 32 25 40 6 6 12 
20 21 f 35 25 66 9 5 14 
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Table of Data -- Continued 
s Age Sex Milliseconds Frequency of Agreement Prelim. Start Recog. greater smaller Total 
21 20 f 57 31 51 9 6 15 
22 21 f 58 29 92 7 5 12 
23 20 f 48 26 98 7 2 9 
24 20 f 30 24 57 5 5 10 
25 20 f 40 26 31 11 6 17 
26 21 f 48 26 58 8 7 15 
27 19 f 30 25 41 3 5 8 
28 19 f 60 34 92 10 3 13 
29 21 m 37 25 77 4 5 9 
30 20 m 30 25 96 8 8 16 
31 20 f 34 27 42 10 4 14 
32 21 m 52 32. 100/1 9 6 15 
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APPENDIX E 
EXPERIMENT II - ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
Each of 16 male and W female Ss received one score 
representing the number of times (out of 12 presentations) 
that his response agreed with the flashed stimulus sreater 
and a second score representing comparable agreements with 
smaller. The means and standard deviations of these scores 
(transformed to />=2 arcsin {P) are given in Tabla II, p.75. 
Analysis of variance was employed to determine (1) 
W2ether the response "greater" was used more frequently 
(constant error) and (2} whether either sex responded more 
in accordance with the fJa shes than did the other. 
TABLE E-1 
AGREEMENT WITH FLASH: ANALYSIS CF V ARIA.t'TCE 
Source Sum of Mean Squares D.f. Square F 
TOTAL 12.3022 63 
Constant Error 2.6875 1 2.6875 15.27* 
Sex .0072 1 .0072 
Constant Error x Sex .5097 1 .5097 
Subjects 4.1507 30 .1384 
Constant Error X Ss 4. 9471 30 .1649 
*P < .01; error term is pooled interactions 
APPENDIX F 
LATENCIES OF THIRTEEN "INFLUENCED" SUBJECTS 
Mid-Stimulus 
Analysis of variance was used to test the rela-
tionship of latency of responding to (1) occurrence of 
greater or smaller as the incidental stimulus, and (2) 
agreement of Ss• responses with such stimulus. All of 
the raw latency values had been transformed to their 
logarithms. Each S 1 s trials were divided into four 
TABLE F-1. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN LATENCIES 
Source Sum ot D.f. Mean F Squares Square 
TOTAL 0.79315 51 
Incidental stimulus .00042 1 .00042 
Agreement with incid. .00002 1 .00002 
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Incid'l .x Agreement .01934 1 .01934 7.70* 
Subjects .68295 12 .05691 22.66** 
Ss .x Incid'l stimulus .02289 12 .00191 
Ss .x Agreement .01323 12 .00110 
Ss .x Incid'l .x Agree. .05430 12 .00453 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
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groups, according as the incidental stimulus had been 
greater or smaller and as the response had been in a-
greement or disagreement with this incidental stimulus. 
The mean of the log. latencies was computed for each 
group; thus each subject yielded four mean log. latencies. 
The interaction variances involving Ss may be com-
bined to yield an error term against which the main ef-
fects and the interaction of incidental stimulus by 
agreement of response with such stimulus may be evalu-
ated. 
The results indicate: (1) that there is wide vari-
ation in the characteristic latencies of Ss; (2) that 
the constant error which was noted in the relative ac-
curacies is also reflected in the relative latencies--
i.e., Ss made the judgment "greater" not only more often 
but also more rapidly than they made the judgment "small-
er." No tendency was found for latency to vary concomi-
tantly with the incidental appearance of the word greater 
or smaller, or with S's agreement with such word. 
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DISCRIMINATION WITHOUT AWARE}l"'ESS IN A PSYCHOPHYSICAL ·TASK 
(Library of Congress No. lv:.ic ) 
Preston Davis, Jr., Ph.D. 
Boston University Graduate School, 1960 
Major Professor: Professor Austin w. Berkeley 
Discrimination without awareness of the stimuli being 
responded to has been observed in a number of different ex-
perimental situations. In the classic case, the subject is 
instructed to relax or to engage in what is essentially a 
task of imagination, whi~e incidental stimulation is presented 
at a level of intensity or duration such that he remains un-
aware of its presence. Responses of some comparatively un-
restricted type are collected and analyzed for effects at-
tributable to the stimulation. 
Present interest is in the case where the subject is 
effortfully attending to an objective task of discrimination. 
His range of possible responses to the task is quite narrow, 
and he is required to respond almost at once. The inciden-
tally supplied stimulation is of a novel class, different 
from the stimulus material of the attended task; it is such 
as to present directly one of the possible task responses. 
The method used was an adaptation of a psychophysical 
judgment procedure, with individual subjects viewing the 
materials in a tachistoscope. A rectangular patch of stand-
ard size was presented first, followed in a few seconds by a 
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test patch of variable size; the subject was required to re-
port whether the ~tter was greater or smaller than the 
standard. A brief, unnoticed flash preceding the test patch 
carried the word greater or smaller or a nonsense control 
stimulus. 
A first experiment, using only three subjects, failed 
to yield any evidence of influence upon the judgments due to 
the unnoticed incidental words. 
In the second experiment, 32 subjects participated. The 
duration of the incidental flash waa gradually increased un-
til the subject reported noticing its presence. Statis~tical 
analysis was restricted to the l&st 40 responses obtained at 
duration levels lower than the level at which recognition 
occurred. 
For the test patch of the same size as the standard 
(which had been presented on 24 of the 40 trials), it was 
clear that some subjects had indeed been influenced in the 
direction of agreeing with the unnoticed greater or smaller. 
The effect was statistically significant over all 32 subjects. 
About ten achieved a high degree of agreement with the inci-
dental word, while the agreement scores of the others were 
distributed in approximately a chance fashion. Agreement 
was not influenced by sex of the subject. 
Four other test patches were of sizes greater or smaller 
than the standard. For two of these patches, subjects re-
sponded more accurately following the appropriate flash of 
greater or smaller than following the nonsense flash. 
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No consistent relationships were found between latency 
of responding and agreement with the flashed stimulus. 
It is concluded from the main result that attended 
judgments of objective matters are (among some individuals) 
subject to influence from unreportable stimulation which 
directly presents the response to be used. This implies 
some necessary modification or extension of remarks made 
by Klein and others relative to this point. While atten-
tion usually acts to exclude activations which would be con-
sciously rejected as inappropriate, such activations do 
(among some individuals) in a significant number of cases 
influence attended behavior w1thout becoming conscious. 
A tentative conceptualization of the process is pre-
sented, based on psychoanalytic considerations by Kris 
and Fisher~ 
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